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In my investigation of Li-Young Lee's poetry, my concerns
were two-fold: first, to find evidence of an androgynous
quality or ideal; secondly, to demonstrate that ideal as
authentically feminist. In the introduction, I investigate
the feminist debate about the traditional definition and
concept of androgyny, demonstrating the difference between
the patriarchal traditional androgyny and the androgynous
elements in Lee's poetry.
In Chapter Two, the rose as image and as symbol in Lee's
poetry is examined and found to be strikingly androgynous as
a symbol. As an image, however, it is more often than not
used as a vehicle to describe the destructive nature of
social tyrannies such as the patriarchal symbolic order.
In Chapter Three, Lee's heavy implications of an existing
"other" is examined. This examination is particularly
pertinent when considering the feminist debate, since one of
the major problems with the idea of androgyny is that it
often necessitates a binary thought system in which the male
is usually the "one" and the female is usually the "other."
In Lea's poetry, I found no significant evidence of that
kind of phallocentricism; rather, I found substantial
evidence that Lee's poetry demonstrates the destructiveness
of insisting on any being's otherness. Lee's search for
identity, and for the meaning of personal identity, involves
the acceptance of the mutability of identity.
In conclusion, although I don't find androgyny to be
authentically feminist, I find Lee's poetry--and its
particular use of an androgynous ideal--to be authentically
feminist.
INTRODUCTION
Life, is it not the combat
of two forces?
--Honore de Balzac
The truth is, a great mind
is androgynous.
--Samuel Coleridge
As wonderful and enlightened as C
oleridge's dictum may
at first seem, a number of ques
tions are immediately raised:
what exactly is androgyny? how do
es it relate to literature
past and present? what effect doe
s it have on sex/gender
studies?
Carolyn Heilbrun has written exte
nsively on the subject
of androgyny and literature. She
 defines androgyny thus:
This ancient Greek word--from and
ro (male)
and gyn (female)--defines a condi
tion under
which the characteristics of the 
sexes, and
the human impulses expressed by
 men and
women, are not rigidly assigned
.
Androgyny suggests a spirit of
reconciliation between the sexes;
 it
suggests, further, a full range of
 experience
open to individuals who may, as w
omen,
be aggressive, as men, tender; it
 suggests a
spectrum upon which human beings 
choose their






Heilbrun is no more satisfied with this defin
ition than
any critic should be, and she recognizes the 
dangers in
perpetuating rigid ideas about what is mascul
ine and what is
feminine, even as one claims to be attempting
 to invert
them. However, it remains that in mythology, l
iterature,
religion, philosophy, and psychology, there a
re symbols,
images, ideas, and archetypes traditionally attr
ibuted to
either primary masculine or primary feminine pr
inciples, and
the union of such principles has heretofore cons
tituted an
androgynous state of being. The previous critical
approaches to androgyny in literature discussed 
in this
introduction rely on such traditional methods of
 reading a
text. It is important to remember that the ver
y nature of
the critical tradition is informed by a phall
ogocentric
language and discourse as well as a patriarchal 
culture;
therefore, when speaking of primary masculine
 and feminine
principles, earlier critics relied on gender con
structs that
were detrimental to the representation and the pol
ity of
women. The feminist concerns about the relationsh
ips
between these constructs ana the idea of androgyny
 are
examined in Chapter One, but in order to unders
tand those
concerns fully we must have an overview of the tra
ditional
sense and use of androgyny in literature.
Studies in androgyny in literature usually begin 
with
Plato's Symposium, although primal and divine
 androgynous
beings were found in most ancient societies. Th
e character
in Plato's work, Aristophanes, posits th
e myth that
originally there were three wholes: all 
male, all female,
and male and female. When these wholes 
were split, each was
forced to search for its other half, som
e in heterosexual
love, others in homosexual love. Greek 
culture and myth
abounded with androgynous art and tales:
 Eros and Psyche,
Hermes and Aphrodite, et.al. The vin/yan
q symbol
represented the androgyne for Chinese Ta
oists; the Yab-Yum
represented it for the Tantrics. Even C
hristian theology
gives Christ an androgynous nature, and G
nostic Christians
assert that Sophia is the female half of
 Christ (Walker 33-
34). These myths are prominently feature
d in myth criticism
of androgyny in literature.
In psychology Jung reigns supreme in the
 investigation
of the androgynous psyche, and Jungian li
terary criticism
relies on the fusion of gender-specific a
rchetypes
(basically similar to attributed sex-spe
cific principles) to
produce an androgyne. Jung hypothesized
 that women need to
acknowledge and understand the masculine 
archetype, the
animus, in their psyche, and that men nee
d to acknowledge
and understand the feminine archetype, th
e anima, in their
psyche. In other words, the opposites sh
ould unite, should
bridge the gap between the conscious and
 unconscious mind,
and merge; this merging is found in gnos
ticism, alchemy,




Albeit only a sampling of the idea of the an
drogyne in
myth, religious, and psychological thought
, evidence
suggests that the concept would necessarily 
be prevalent in
literature, which is so heavily influenced
 by myth and
religion. Heilbrun traces androgyny through
 Greek
literature, Shakespeare, Ariosto, Mann, Br
itish and American
poetry, the British and American novel, and 
finally, through
the Bloomsbury group and Woolf. What she 
finds is that
various forms of androgyny are pervasive i
n Western
literature of the past, that it is no more p
ervasive in the
works of women than in the works of men, and
 that present-
day literature does not offer itself as any 
more androgynous
in a traditional reading than past literat
ure, despite the
women's movement.
There are a number of strategies critics emp
loy to
prove a work is androgynous, a character is 
androgynous, or
an author is androgynous: Robert Bly's andro
gyne lives in
the tension created by the opposition, identif
ying wholly
with neither male nor female principles (Iro
n John 175).
Heilbrun posits the author's uses of disguis
ed females as
males, overpowering love between male and fe
male, atypical
gender behavior of characters, inversion of 
power, the
positing of male-female twins, reader identifi
cation with
both sexes equally, symbolism, irony, and psyc
hoanalytic
theory to show that a work is androgynous.
Using Freudian terms, Donna Moder suggests tha
t the
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poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins projects "a psych
ical
fragmentation of gender in the speaker, a compuls
ion to
vacillate between masculine and feminine identifi
cations"
(2). James Holt McGavran, Jr., informs his 
reading of
Coleridge using the myth of Tereus and Philomel
a to show how
Coleridge tries to save William and Dorothy Words
worth from
their systematic destruction of the androgynous n
ature of
their work. In a Jungian analysis of William Eve
rson--and
peripherally of Whitman, Rilke, Yeats and Blake--
Lee
Bartlett examines the "sexual struggle . . . of t
he
masculine and feminine aspects of the Self as a p
ath of
gnosis" (296).
The work of women writers as well is often invest
igated
for androgyncul themes. Marcella Taylor posits E
mily
Dickinson's poetry as androgynous and as mythmaki
ng by
"remolding age-old fictions [like essential sexua
l
differences] so that they find relevance in the c
ontemporary
world" (131). In his considerable work on Mary S
helley's
Fi.ankenstein, William Veeder uses the androgynous 
concepts
of the Shelleys, along with the traditional myth of
 Eros and
Agape. Lorelei Cederstrom uses Jungian archetype
s to
demnstrate how Doris Lessing's The Golden Notebook
 is an
exercise in individuation, the establishing of a un
ified
personality, harmonizing all the archetypes of the 
psyche.
Once a critic is versed in the archetypes, pri
nciples,
6
symbols, and imagery utilized in t
raditional critical
methods to find examples of androg
yny in literature, one can
readily apply them to a reading of
 a great deal of poetry,
including Li-Young Lee's. However
, as I mentioned above,
the current critical debate among 
feminist and other
contemporary critics regarding and
rogyny and essential sex
differences is an important one, a
nd my reading of Lee's
poetry as discussed in this thesis 
is irformed by the
various related issues in that deb
ate. In Chapter One I
address the major concerns of the pr
imary participants in
the debate, peripherally using Lee's
 poetry for illustration
and explication of those issues. 
In Chapter Two, I
investigate Lee's symbolism and imag
ery of the rose and
expose it as androgynous and anti-es
sentialist when used as
a symbol; as an image the rose repre
sents some of the more
destructive results of fixed identit
ies and cultural tyranny
over others. In Chapter Three, Lee'
s poetry is examined for
its direct and indirect references t
o an "other"; I believe
his particular use of "other" to be 
further evidence of the
androgynous ideal in Lee's poetry.
Lee is a 36-year-old Chinese-American
 who immigrated to
America with his family when he was 
five. His poetry is
featured prominently in literary jou
rnals and anthologies,
and he has won various important and 
prestigious awards for
his work. Lee works with a number
 of themes, but there are
7
several which seem to be prevalent: the
 search for meaning
and identity in a confusing and homo
geneous world, the
question of love and forgiveness, the q
uestion of memory and
nostalgia, and the elements of tragic j
oy seemingly inherent
in human life; Lee explores each o
f these themes via the
myth of the father.
Certainly, the myth of the father resem
bles a human
father in Lee's work; it presides over
 the poems, prompting
them, leading them, supporting them, an
d even criticizing
them. The father--as well as the son-
-takes on a number of
roles: teacher, preacher, disciplinaria
n, lover, son, the
abandoned and the abandoning, the banishe
d and the
banishing. Every review thus far writt
en on Lee's poetry
discusses the theme, or as it is often 
called, the myth, of
the father in Lee's poetry. Gerald Ste
rn goes so far as to
suggest that the father is the "critica
l 'myth' in Lee's
poetry" (Rose 9). Liam Rector describes 
the father as
mythical in essence, as well as in scop
e: "Lee's meditations
upon the father, the father who is both
 inspiring and
spanking, are . . . rueful so that we c
an see the father
within the son, the poker within the fi
re, the myth as it
moves from soul to soul" (400). Lee's re
al father's
personal history has a profoundly mythica
l aura: he was
personal physician to Mao Zedong, a pro
fessor of English and
philosophy at Gamaliel University in Ja
karta, and a
political prisoner of President Sukarno
's in Indonesia;
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after being released from prison he fl
ed the country,
arriving, after five years of wanderin
g with his family, in
America, where he became a Presbyteria
n minister.
Lee's poetic style has been variously r
eferred to as
having "simple, child-like diction" (Fl
amm 24), colloquial
(Muske 20), lyrical, "dense" with lan
guage" (Kitchen 162),
"elegant, delicate, and reticent" (Wani
ek 223), "incautious,
even excessive" (Kitchen 422), "flirting 
with
sentimentality" (McGovern 135), "loose,
 relaxed, and [with
an] open plainness" (Barker 165), and t
ender (Mitchell 137).
The paradoxical nature of the reviews o
f Lee's poetry--the
interpretations of his technique and l
anguage--is indicative
of the character of the poetry itself;
 it is intentionally
paradoxical, even getting its sublimit
y from that element of
it. Jessica Greenbaum rightly suggests
 that Stern's
introduction to Rose "stands as the mos
t valuable prose
about Lee's work" (417). Stern writes
:
I have tried to discover the art in the
se
poems, to see how one line moves into t
he
next, how one stanza flows into another
, how
the energy—and tension--is maintained,
 why
is works better in some poems than in o
thers. He
is a difficult poet to analyze. The
technique is not only not transparent 
but
there is a certain effortlessness about
 the
writing that disguises the complexity 
of
9
technique . . I sometimes feel t
hat
technique, particularly in such po
ets,




the language of those feelings. T
his is not
to say that technique takes care of 
itself. It is
to reaffirm that art is mystery an
d our critical
prose only begins to penetrate it. 
(9-10)
Lee's art is a mystery, as is all ar
t to a degree.
However, we are daily discovering mo
re and more about
language, and the mystery of our l
anguage is becoming less
and less mysterious, particularly th
e patriarchal and
phallogocentric nature of the lang
uage. Given that Lee is a
male writer who has been educated in
 a system that is more
aware of the concerns of women than 
previous generations, I
find it heartening and fascinating t
hat for the most part he
is able to demonstrate an appreciati
on for an androgynous
ideal withc-At either trampling on th
e "other" to get to it
or exhibiting a paralyzing fear of l
osing sexual potency.
Lee's androgynous ideal is most evid
ent in the exploration
of identity and the right of each in
dividual to a unique,
uncircumscribed, and mutable identit
y. Jacques Derrida's
differance suggests that "identity .
 . . cannot be defined
in itself or in terms of what it is i
n the present, but only
in terms of what it differs from or 
what temporally it
defers. Hence, what one is not is a
n element . . . of one's
10
own identity" (Weil 10). In Lee's search for identity, its
existence and its meaning, his speaker makes what he is not
as much an integral component of his identity as what he is;
consequently, the differance becomes part of what he is. He
deconstructs the opposition of difference and renders fixed
or constructed gender identities moot.
Feminist critics are involved in a great struggle to
recover their voice in the literary and academic worlds;
critics now know that woman's voice in literature has been
silenced, amputated, and mutated by the traditional
patriarchal discourse. Conscientious critics are quite
aware of what needs to be done, so their debate is centered
on what methods of change are better for women;
conscientious artists of both sexes are struggling to create
literature that doesn't continue to relegate one sex to a
position of inferiority. I believe Lee's artistic and
critical struggles include being faithful to his unique
identity without denying the equally glorious identity of an
other, and he must do this using a language steeped in
phallogocentricism; his attempt has an ambitious scope, one
that many great writers and thinkers attempted and failed to
render. But we do not call them failures. We call them
poets.
ANDROGYNY, THE SOUL AS NEUTER,
AND THE FEMINIST DEBATE
Perhaps to think, as I had been
thinking these two days, of one sex
as distinct from the other is an
effort. It interferes with the
unity of the mind. Now that effort
had ceased and that unity had been
restored by seeing two people come
together and get into a taxi-cab.
--Virginia Woolf
Little could Virginia Woolf know, when she had her
epiphany of an androgynous vision and image, what a furor of
debate would one day ensue because of it. There are valid
questions and concerns about using the concept of androgyny
as an axis for literary criticism and theory; indeed, Li-
Young Lee's comment about androgyny implies a number of
those concerns: in a letter he wrote, "About androgyny; the
soul is neuter, isn't it?" Well, yes; the problem is that
while the soul may be neuter, the language and the culture
are not; additionally, neuter in a patriarchal society
usually means the One or God, implying masculine supremacy
over the "other," often meaning woman.
I am quite certain Lee did not deliberately insinuate
male supremacy by his comment; however, feminist critics
have found that the patriarchal nature of the language, and
its construction of gender identities, is endemic in the
language and has served as a means of naintaining
patriarchal control for centuries. In this chapter, I
11
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approach the various debates among feminist critics that
directly and indirectly involve the concept of androgyny as
it pertains to gender constructs and criticism, using
excerpts from Lee's poetry as examples. I do not posit
androgyny as the cure for sexism in literature, language, or
literary criticism; what I do suggest is that there is a
better and more feminist-friendly approach to androgyny than
we in the literary world have seen thus far.
When Carolyn Heilbrun first published Toward a 
Recognition of Androgyny in 1964, it was generally seen as
an idea whose time had come. The political stage of the
sixties was unisexually cast--men with long hair, women in
jeans. In Julia Kristeva's schema of the evolution of
feminism, this was a tier of liberal feminism in which
"[w]omen demanded equal access to the symbolic order" (Moi
12). By the 1973 annual meeting of the Modern Language
Association, however, a different
moving through academe; this tier
idea of radical feminism in which
stage of feminism was
correlated with Kristeva's
"[w]omen reject the male
symbolic order in the name of difference" (Moi 12). Papers
presented at the conference were compiled in the second
volume of Women's Studies and were primarily a response to
the idea of androgyny in literature. The essays
consistently condemned the idea of androgyny; "the majority
of these essays conclude that androgyny is essentially a
I
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masculine ideal and one inappropriate 
for women wishing to
advance themselves or to promote the n
ew discipline of
women's studies in the academy" (Wei
l 151). Only Heilbrun's
essay and the joint essay of Nancy Top
pin Bazin and Alma
Freeman extolled the idea of androgyny
 as a constructive
theory in literature, positing a metap
hysical androgyne
rather than a physical hermaphrodite; in
 other words,
androgyny need not be used to suppress w
omen's celebrations
of their bodies--rather, it should be 
used to thwart the
patriarchy's gender constructions that
 at best subordinate
women and are at worst misogynist. Th
is position most
closely correlates with Kristeva's third
 tier of feminism,
in which "[w]omen reject the dichotomy b
etween masculine and
feminine as metaphysical" by deconstru
cting the opposition






Showalter published A Literature  of
she accuses Woolf of
femaleness and to fly away






"gynocriticism" and is its leading expo
nent; gynocriticism
is a paradigm founded on reading liter
ature for its female
authors, its female characters, and its r
epresentation of
the female experience. French literary
 critics such as
Kristeva, Helene Cixous, and Luce Irig
aray see the
gynocritic's approach as an attempt to 
replace the "man" at
the center of the humanist ideal with 
"woman." Since the
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humanist ideal has been structured by a pat
riarchal language
and culture, feminists attraction to it s
eems, to a number
of critics, destructive to the very inten
tions of feminist
criticism. The French idea of l'ecriture femi
nine, or
women's writing, is one in which fixed gender 
meanings and
identities are impossible; this criticism has 
been coined
"gynesis." Mary Eagleton explains the essenti
al difference
between these feminist approaches in relation 
to the debate
about Woolf's androgynous ideal:
In gynesis belief in the individual as a fully-
conscious, rational, secure identity gives way t
o
a 'subject' which is unstable and constantly
reformed. Kristeva uses the phrase "subject in
process" to convey how "our identities in life are
constantly called into question, brought to tria
l,
over-ruled." Following this interpretation,
[Torii] Moi considers Woolf's exploration of
multiple selves not as a loss of integrity, but 
as
an interrogation of humanism's obsession with the
individual, and an opening up of subjectivity to
change. For gynocriticism, liberation is to find
one's true self; for gynesis, liberation is the
abandonment of one's true self. (11)
In order to decimate the phallocentric and patriar
chal
order which keeps women subordinate and silent, 
the notions




being--must be eliminated, or at least proven to be false.
It is in this way the French feminists approach the
political problems of women. Peggy Kamuf posits Michel
Foucault's anti-humanist theories as an example of what will
happen with a feminist criticism which relies on the same
philosophical ground as their patriarchal predecessors,
finally asking, "If feminist theory can be content to
propose cosmetic modifications on the face of humanism and
its institutions, will it have done anything more than
reproduce the structure of woman's exclusion in the same
code which has been extended to include her?" (57).
Gynesis notwithstanding, Showalter's gynccriticism is a
necessary step in the theory and polity of feminism; it is
an homage to woman as woman, as writer, as essential and
equal participant in the world. In view of these elements
of gynocriticism, it is initially surprising that Showalter
would choose to center her arguments and attacks on the
mother of our contemporary feminist thought and criticism;
however, it is little wonder she finds Woolf's ideas so
distracting--nearly heinous--and why she uses the
androgynous ideal as a whipping post, when given her
interpretation of the ideal posited in A Room of One's Own:
The androgynous mind is, finally, a utopian
projection of the ideal artist: calm, stable,
unimpeded by consciousness of sex. Woolf meant it
to be a luminous and fulfilling idea; but, like
16
other utopian projections, her vision is inhuman.
Whatever else one may say of androgyny, it
represents an escape from the confrontation with
femaleness or maleness. Her ideal artist
mystically transcends sex, or has none. One could
imagine another approach to androgyny, however,
through total immersion in the individual
experience, with all its restrictions of sex and
anger and fear and chaos. A thorough
understanding of what it means, in every respect,
to be a woman, could lead the artist to an
understanding of what it means to be a man. (30-
1)
In the first place, we must differentiate between "sex," a
biological state of being, and "gender," a fixed image and
interpretation of being based solely on sex and constructed
by a male-dominated language and culture. Given this
distinction, in replacing the term "sex" in Showalter's
comments with "gender" we get an entirely different concept
of androgyny, and a concept closer to what Woolf, I believe,
intended; Woolf's androgyne is not without consciousness of
sex, but is rather without the consciousness and
restrictions of gender. Secondly, I will clearly show the
error in Showalter's suggestion that an androgynous mind
must be "calm" and "stable"; on the contrary, Lee's
speaker's androgynous nature is not fired or passive, but
17
rather mutable and active: Androgyny
, then,  is an escape 
from the  patriarchal gender construct, 
not from the 
biological sex. Thirdly, the differences
 in a woman's
experience and a man's experience are
 based solely on either
biology or political climate, and even
 sex-specific
experiences differ among men and women;
 therefore, a man
cannot fully represent a woman's "exp
erience," nor vice
versa, no matter what may be understoo
d about his/her own
particular sex. The patriarchy chooses
 and names which
experiences are gender-specific, thereb
y insinuating its own
ideas about what experiences are gender-s
pecific, and
representing women, it is usually -Irong
.2
Under Showalter's leadership, androgyny r
emained
idea under attack until 1985 when Toni
 Moi published





concept of androgyny to the French litera
ry theories of
Kristeva and Jacques Derrida, saying th
at Woolf "understood
that the goal of the feminist struggle 
must precisely be to
deconstruct the death-dealing binary oppo
sition of
masculinity and femininity" (13). Th
ese are the very
oppositions and fixed identities which tr
aditional male-
humanism has served to perpetuate, and th
ey include and
promote the "restrictions of sex" Showalt
er has proposed
necessary for an acceptable concept of an
drogyny. Therein
lies one of the major disagreements betwe
en the
interpretations of Moi and Showalter,
 who not only disagree
18
about what androgyny is, but also about wha
t it should be.3
The feminist concern with the idea of androgy
ny is thus
twofold: First, it is the male symbolic orde
r of language
and literature that has created the androgyne
 and,
therefore, has the power over its qualities
. Second, when
approaching a description of masculine and femi
nine
principles, one may re-hierachize the element
s and relegate
the feminine principles to the category of a 
negative
"other," a place where women have found no eq
uality or
comfortable discourse as yet. These concerns
 are pertinent
in each of the five main foci that Raman Selden
 posits as
elemental in discussions of sexual difference
, and which are
consequently elemental in the discussion of and
rogyny. In
reviewing these foci, we can see that for each 
of them there
is a converse question to be addressed: 1) B
iology--On the
one hand, if a woman is reduced to her body, th
en the order
takes over and women lose individual power; on 
the other
hand, despite the danger of asserting female su
periority
based on the biological abilities of women, it 
is important
for women to celebrate their bodies; 2) Experie
nce--Women
biologically, emotionally, and perceptively exp
erience life
differently and are therefore more qualified to
 write about
women, yet to limit women to gender-specific expe
riences
significantly limits their representation in li
terature; 3)
Discourse--Michael Foucault argues that the "tr
uth" is
monitored by who controls discourse and, unfortun
ately, that
19
has been men; it remains, however, that to 
replace the
patriarchal truth with an essentially matria
rchal truth
would risk a reverse anti-truth; 4) The 
unconscious--
Psychoanalytic theories posit the feminine 
principles as
associated with the processes of the unc
onscious and which,
therefore, subvert the male-dominated disc
ourse by refusing
to define/structuralize/close the definition
s of female
sexuality; albeit to relegate the feminine t
o the
"mysterious" unconscious has continually serve
d to keep the
patriarchy in control of the conscious; 5) 
Socio-economic
conditions--Marxist and feminist critics app
roach the debate
from the idea of the changing social and e
conomic balance of
power and reject the notion of essential f
emininity that can
undermine that balance (136-7).
Selden's first focus, the question of whethe
r there
exist essential differences between the se
xes, has turned
into an intense debate among feminist crit
ics: the
essentialists vs. the anti-essentialists. T
he primary
concern the anti-essentialists have is tha
t essentialism is
dangerously close to biologism in which the 
patriarchy can
use women's bodies against them; the primary c
oncern for the
essentialists is that women should celebrate
 and experience
the femaleness of their bodies without sha
me or fear of
political, personal, or professional repercu
ssions. Kari
Weil's recent book about androgyny in lite
rature, Androgyny 
and the Denial of Difference (1992),
 approaches the concept
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from the perspective of this debate;
 for example, Heilbrun
is accused of ignoring the differe
nces between the male and
female body in her ideal of androg
yny (Weil 149), the
implication being that she is squeami
sh about women's bodies
and women's experiences. Moi is acc
used of the same
squeamishness.
Weil's argument is informed by the
 essentialist
movement, although she recognizes 
the problems in it.
She fails, however, to acknowledge
 the reasoning behind
Heilbrun's anti-essentialist conce
pt of androgyny: the
androgyne is a metaphysical entity
, unlike the hermaphrodite
which is a physical anomaly, and in 
this definition one may
break free from the limitations of g
ender constructs while
maintaining the integrity of one's
 biological sex. Heilbrun
doesn't dismiss sexual difference 
or the experiential
differences between the sexes--in 
fact, her Writing a 
Woman's Life is centered around th
e idea of the vital
importance for women to write their 
own stories and
experiences in their own words; what
 Heilbrun does with
androgyny is, rather, to set up th
e possibility of an
identity which is not defined by its
 gender.4
In Lee's poetry, the androgynous n
ature of the speaker
is highly metaphysical, as I belie
ve I repeatedly
demonstrate in my examination of his
 work, particularly in
its homage to the idea of an essen
tially unique and ever-
changing consciousness and its searc
h for meaning and
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identity in such a mercurial consciousness
; for example:
The noise the body makes
when the body meets
the soul over the soul's ocean and penumbr
a
is the old sound of up-and down, in-and-
out,
a lump of muscle chug-chugging blood
into the ear; a lover's
heart-shaped tongue;
flesh rocking flesh until flesh comes;
the butcher working at his block to marry 
their
shapes . • • (City 80)
The image of the sexual union of two bodie
s is being used
metaphorically as a vehicle to describe the 
union of the
body and soul. Bodies are differentiated 
only by a
corruption:
Brothers and sisters by blood and design,
who sit in separate bodies of varied shape
s,
we constitute a many-membered
body of love.
In a world of shapes
of my desires, each one here
is a shape of one of my desires, and each
is known to me and dear by virtue
of each one's unique corruption
of those texts, the face, the body . (city
81)
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Any physical differences, then, are corruptions of an
original, but it is the corruption that identifies them to
the speaker; they are random differences, not assigned by
sex, and similar to Weil's description of Cixous's "other
bisexuality": "sexuality is a set of effects, not causes,
and its inscriptions on the body are multiple, not dual"




of a text, but, thus, it
acquires salience, although a
human salience, but
inimitable, and, hence, memorable.
God is the text.
The soul is a corruption
and a mnemonic. (City 81-2)
Each human soul is a corruption of the original as well, but
by virtue of its corruption it is unique and individual.
Identity, then, cannot be codified for the soul or the body.
Lee's is a search for origin, meaning, and identity
that transcends the sex of the body or an inscribed set of
essential same or different principles among a sex. In his
poetry, Lee's speaker questions the notion of a fixed
identity even as he searches for meaning in his own mutable
identity. In the search and the questioning, one answer
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seems to resonate: there are no fixe
d identities and
certainly no fixed gender identities
, no characteristics
inherently applied to female or ma
le, either for Lee's
speaker or for almost all of the cha
racters in his work.
The androgynous nature of Lee's spea
ker is more about
acknowledging and accepting all of 
what makes an identity
without insisting on fixed rules, in
cluding fixed gender
construction. Moi wrote, "I would s
tress . that a
theory that demands the deconstructi
on of sexual identity is
indeed authentically feminist" (14);
 given that definition,
then, Lee's poetry proves to be femi
nist.
Lee's poetry is not without images o
f the physical
body, and biological differences bet
ween the sexes are not
inconsequential in his more erotic p
oems. In "The Waiting,"
a man and a woman have sexual interc
ourse while she is
nursing their child:
the woman, naked, rose
to bring the baby to their bed, and, 
lying
with her back to the man,
suckled the boy while
the man lay longing, hard yet, thigh
s wet
from her, and on his chest
her odor.
By murmurs and thingless words
the mother answers
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her son's sucking, his
gulping and mewling.
Rolling towards them, the man
reaches around her waist to strok
e the boy's
head.
Slowly, she reaches behind
and clasps him, fastens
him to her, while he
half mounts her damp length,




thus, sleep a few hours,
until one rises
for work, in light
the color of breast milk drained 
on the sheet.
'63)
There is an obvious traditional r
ole in this sexual
experience: the mother as life-gi
ver. It's worth noting,
however, that this excerpt comes 
immediately after one in
which the man is nurturing his so
n. What is important is
the "complicated" image of the "th
ree bodies" and the
"light/the color of breast milk dr
ained on the sheet."
There are three elements drained o
n that sheet--light,
breast milk, and semen--and they 
are commingled,
"complicated" like the three ind
ividuals; the speaker could
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be referring to one, two, or all three of the elements.5
Another interesting aspect is that "one rises/for work," and
the "one" is not assigned a gender.
Lee's poetry is concerned with experience, Selden's
second focus, but his is an experience which is not
fundamentally gender-specific: "But I own a human
story,/whose very telling/remarks loss" (City 26). He
writes about "all of our essential, human separateness"
(Rose 54), a separateness that has nothing to do with
gender, but with the salient "corruptions" mentioned above.
This does not correspond to essential sameness--it is
essential difference between related--or "same"--identities.
Lee is not denying difference, but neither is he putting
difference on a higher, more important plane than sameness.
In "My Sleeping Loved Ones," the speaker is given no
recongizeable gender. The poem is about loving one's
family:
More than the cheekbones I inherited from my
mother,
more than my left hand, the spear,
or my right hand, the hammer, more
than humility, like my father's heavy hand
on the back of my neck,
it is my love
for the sleeping loved ones
which recommends me.
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It is my attention to their needs, my spec
ial
tenderness . . (Rose 64)
Again, chis is a human experience; tendern
ess is not
relegated to the feminine, nor aggression 
to the masculine;
the speaker's inheritance from the mothe
r and father is not
gender related.
capacity to love
to a defining of
inconsequential.
The speaker's primary inheritance is his
and nurture--it is that which contribute
s
his identity in which gender is
Again, it is his sameness which recommends
him rather than his difference or the corr
uptions of others.
The feminist concern with male writers wri
ting about
the female experience is a consequent deba
te between
essentialist and anti-essentialist critics
. In Lee's poetry
there is very little reason for concern by
 the essentialist
camp; he makes no pretense of being able t
o transcribe the
human female's life experiences, as biolog
y and political
climate render them different. The poems 
about the mother,
as well as any reference to her, find her 
cooking, singing,
fixing her hair, making toys for her child
ren; she never
speaks or thinks, simply exists as an imag
e projected. The
wife in Lee's poetry is likewise greatly lov
ed and desired,
but like the mother, her experiential worl
d is one-
dimensional. The problem with this way of i
llustrating the
wife is that in the poems where the speaker is
 specified as
male and the spouse as female, the wife'
s roles are sexual
partner, mother to sons, and a sort of nec
essary angel for
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the speaker's epiphanies and 
creativity; in other words, sh
e
doesn't exist except in her r
elation to the speaker. Le
e's
refusal to attempt a three-dim
ensional female character
would be considered a positiv
e aspect of his work by many
critics, but if the argument i
s applied to a poem it beco
mes
problematic. In "This Room an
d Everything in It" the
speaker recalls the sexual exp
erience he has just had with
his wife:
Lie still now
while I prepare for my future,
certain hard days ahead,
when I'll need what I know so cl
early at this
moment. (City 49)
She mustn't talk; he's thinking
. He's trying to utilize a




of spice and a wound,
I'll let stand for mystery.
Your sunken belly
is the daily cup
of milk I drank
as a boy before morning prayer.
 (City 49)
Whereas the male wound is assoc
iated with childbirth and
immortality, the female wound 
is most often associated with
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castration, or the lack of the phallus. This is
 a serious
issue in feminist psychoanalytic criticism because 
it allows
the phallocentric culture to maintain control.
Additionally, in letting that "wound . . • stand for
mystery," the speaker puts the female in a position 
in which
he can keep her pliable by interpreting the mystery
 as he
chooses, using the patriarchal discourse designed t
o keep
the feminine in a subordinate position. The one-di
mensional
woman, then, can be as detrimental as the attempt t
o three-
dimensionalize the opposite sex.
There is likewise a great deal of debate about the
patriarchal and phallocentric nature of discourse in 
Western
literature and literary criticism, Selden's third foc
us.
The language has been controlled by men for thousands
 of
years, particularly since men took control of religio
n. In
fact, speech has been controlled by men as well; for
example, in studies of the representation of rape in
literature, the rape victim is more often than not sile
nced
in some way--speech is denied her, control is taken from
her. On a less violent scale, but certainly as prevale
nt,
the active/passive dichotomy between the feminine and
masculine principles has kept the feminine subordinat
e and
mute.
In the study of the unconscious elements of artists in
literature and language, Selden's fourth focus, discour
se is
paramount to an understanding of ways to undermine the
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authority of the phallocentric language. Kristeva's methods
of undermining this authority include recognizing the
polarity between the symbolic order of language which is a
closed rational order, and the open, irrational system of
semiotics, which is pre-language communication:
Because the psychosomatic drives are pre-Oedipal
they are associated with the body of the mother;
the free-floating sea of the womb and the
enveloping sensuousness of the mother's breast are
the first places of pre-Oedipal experience. The
"semiotic" is thus inevitably associated with the
female body, while the "symbolic" is linked with
the Law of the Father which censors and represses
in order that discourse may come into being.
Woman is the silence of the "unconscious" which
precedes discourse. She is the "Other," which
stands outside and threatens to disrupt the
conscious (rational) order of speech.
On the other hand, since the pre-Oedipal
is undifferentiated sexually, the semiotic is not
unequivocally feminine. (qtd. in Selden 150)
In other words, the symbolic and the semiotic are not
exactly binary oppositions: the semiotic is
"undifferentiated sexually," so it is not fundamentally
feminine; the symbolic, however, is constructed by a
patriarchal language, is hence fundamentally masculine, and
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accordingly utilizes the binary thought system. It is th
is
lack of differentiation in the semiotic that allows for t
he
deconstruction of the masculine and feminine principles t
hat
Kristeva considers an element of all revolutionary though
t
and writing.
Kristeva's undifferentiated sexual identities do not
allow for the relegation of the feminine to the "mysterious
"
unconscious, nor do her semiotics allow the patriarchal
binary thought system to reign supreme. This binary thought
system puts women in a position of "other." The feminist
literary critic's problem With the relegation of the fema
le
to a position of "other" is well-founded; however, in Lee's
work the "other" is as often masculine as it is feminine,
and it is usually assigned no recognizable gender identity
at all. The "other" in Lee's poetry is often linked to a
search for a meaning or an identity that an "other" can help
to define; however, this is more often the central question-
-must the "other" be other? In "The City in Which I Love
You" the speaker alternates the gender of "I" and "you."
If I feel the night
move to disclosures or crescendos,
its only because I'm famished
for meaning; the night
merely dissolves.
And your otherness is perfect as my death.
f
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Your otherness exhausts me,
like looking up from here
to impossible stars fading.
Everything is punished by your absence.
(City 55)
There is a Derridean quality in this passage tha
t is
unmistakable. Derrida's theory of differance 
suggests that
it is the "interplay between presence and absenc
e that
produces meaning . . . meaning is never truly 
present, but
is only constructed through the potentially e
ndless process
of referring to other, absent signifiers" (Moi 1
06). Lee's
speaker, then, might be exhausted from this "
endless
process" of searching for meaning; the speaker's
 distress is
heightened because he or she wants meaning, but 
doesn't want
to be separated from the "other" in order to hav
e it. Why
can there be no meaning in one's unique and c
hanging
identity? Why must the "other" be other? The s
peaker's
distress at the culture's insistence that the p
resence of
the one requires the absence of an "other" is pain
fully
expressed, but in saying the "otherness is perfect
 as my
death," he implies that the "otherness" is inev
itable and
unavoidable. In "Furious Versions" the speaker 
is
distressed by endless interpretations of identi
ty, as well
as the vacillating ideas and principles that ma
ke meaning so
difficult to apprehend:
It goes on and it goes on,
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the ceaseless invention, incessant
constructions and deconstructions
of shadows over black grass,
while, overhead, poplars
rock and nod,
wrestle No and Yes, contend
moon, no moon.
I'm like my landlocked poplars: far
from water, I'm full of the sound of water.
But sea-sound differs from the sound of trees:
it owns a rhythm, almost
a meaning, but
no human story,
and so is like
the sound of trees . . (City 25)
This wrestling between principles is far from what the
speaker wants, but it is unavoidable in the mind, in th
e
stars, or in nature. Again, the search is a metaphysic
al
search for an identity that transcends the meaning and 
the
forced identities found in the social construct of lang
uage.
(The "other" in Lee's poetry is discussed fully in Chap
ter
Two.)
I do not mean to imply that there are no specifically
feminine or masculine images in Lee's poetry. One image
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which is predominantly linked to a feminine principle is
hair; however, it should be noted that the feminine
principles in that imagery are not relegated to a fixed
position in a binary system. The predominantly masculine
image, rain, is only relegated to a fixed position by its
connection to the father, and the father's construction of
binary oppositions and gender identities is significantly
built on purely cultural, political, and religious ground--
ground which Lee's speaker finds weak and destructive.
It is the constructed world of this father, the
symbolic order, which is a sexist, racist, classist, ageist,
bigoted, violent patriarchy. It was Woolf who first
introduced the differences between the sexes in socio-
economic conditions as a feminist literary critic's concern,
Selden's fifth focus. Like Woolf, Kristeva's work is a
revolution against the phallocentric order of language:
"What the theory of the unconscious seeks, poetic language
practices, within and against the scial order" (qtd. in
Selden 83). Within and against the social order, Kristeva
suggests. The poet must operate within the language, but he
or she must also operate against it, and this operation must
come from the unconscious, the semiotic realm. The images,
the ideas, the revolutions, come from the unconscious which,
as Lee suggests, is neuter, but they are filtered through a
consciousness that is influenced by a phallogocentric
culture, literature, and language. The amount of the
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sexually "undifferentiated" semiotic that is able to get
through this dense filter should be a consideration in
feminist criticism of an artist's work.
Given this overview of the debate on androgyny in
feminist criticism, my dissatisfaction with the proclamation
that feminists should find androgyny an "inappropriate"
avenue by which to investigate literature is threefold:
First, in order to diminish the patriarchal control over
language, feminists must first understand the nature and
method of that control. Secondly, we should not believe
that because androgyny has been a patriarchal construct it
must necessarily remain one; if we did so, we would likewise
have to believe the language must remain in control of the
patriarchy. Feminist criticism can take its own control by
finding an androgynous literature in which, as Perry Meisel
suggests is the case in Woolf's androgyny, "no natural or
inherent characteristics of any kind" exist (qtd. in Moi,
18). Thirdly, we cannot afford to ignore the significant
changes in society resulting from the feminist movement and
the influence of those changes on new generations of
artists. Bly's generational world and Lee's generational
world are quite different in terms of attitudes toward
women; the effect of that difference on poetry and other
creative arts should be important to feminist critics of
contemporary literature and other arts.
Lee's poetry, while substantially less gender-specific
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than most contemporary poetry, is still problematic. 
As a
feminist, what concerns me most about the concept of
androgyny is that it is most often palatable for critic
s and
readers when it is disguised as a feminized male rath
er than
a masculinized female, and such is the case with Lee'
s
poetry. However, being of the same generation as Lee
, and
being a contributing member to the same academe, I find
 it
intriguing that a contemporary male poet--who, incide
ntally,
is a great admirer of Fay's work--would attempt poetr
y that
is as undifferentiated in its gender as his most cert
ainly
is.
The ultimate questions for me as a feminist mirror
Weil's own, albeit our answers are quite different:
As a feminist who is wary of essentialism, but
wishes to speak as a woman, I am left with a
contradiction. Must I choose between the
essentialist and antiesser:— .7ilist camps? What are
the consequences for an image of androgyny and/or
sexual difference of choosing one side or the
other, or of not choosing at all?
Those questions are vitally important to the feminist
critic, and they should not be answered absolutely or
without a great deal of thought and investigation. At 
this
juncture in my studies, I find Eayleton's positing of t
he
problem an answer in itself:
However paradoxical it might seem, feminists must
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walk in two directions at once. The history of
women and their political needs in the present are
too important to be ignored. Nevertheless, our
understanding of masculinity and femininity must
be profoundly desconstructed; what we now
understand as "we women" will not survive
patriarchy. (16)
When I began this thesis I believed androgyny to be a
positive idea for women in literature, but it's critical to
note that when I began this study I was informed primarily
by traditional methods of criticism. I now recognize that
androgyny is not necessarily a]ways going to provide what
the literature/polity of women need, and I am still
recognizing new aspects of the issue daily. However, at
this writing I believe there is at least room for a new and
improved androgynous ideal in literature and in society,
such as the one I will show enhances Lee's poetry; if there
isn't, then we as women and as critics are limiting
ourselves. I believe we've been limited quite enough.
THE ANDROGYNOUS ROSE
The rose exceeds, the rose
exceeds us all.
--Theodore Roethke
The androgyne is a myth and an ideal. If it exists at
all, it is a literary aberrant and a societal freak. But
for Lee, poetry is "mythmaking" (Knowlton 722), and one of
his inventions is a speaker in his poetry that can, and more
often than not does, operate androgynously. The most
successful attempt at discovering an ever-evolving identity
without fixed gender constructs, an identity which in fact
deconstructs binary oppositions, presupposing the kind of
androgyny discussed in Chapter One, is Lee's use of the rose
as symbol.
There are 37 direct references to a rose(s) in Lee's
first volume of poems, Rose, and 11 direct references in his
second volume, The City in Which I Love You; in both
collections there are still more indirect references. The
heavy use of the rose imagery is significant for a number of
reasons, but for two in particular: as a symbol of a nature
undifferentiated by gender, it is naturally assimilated by
an androgynous speaker; as a symbol of an identity which is
not constructed as a binary system of principles, it is
feminist in its ideal. Below I discuss two roses in
Lee's poems: one is a symbol of unity as a healing element
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and the other is an im
age of the destructivene
ss of
disunity. The first rose 
successfully integrates
 principles
and makes hierarchizing i
mpossible, allaying fem
inist
concerns about such an end
eavor; the second rose i
s not
designed to integrate the
 principles--it intent
ionally sets
up a hierarchy, defining 
the feminist concerns, 
and proves
the hierarchy to be destr
uctive.
Lee's imagery and symbolis
m are acutely personal
, yet
they spring from a place w
hich is supra-personal, 
variously
called the collective unco
nscious or tne imaginati
on. In
describing the voice which
 comes from this place, L
ee says,
"It's a voice that's prio
r to personality and yet 
every time
I speak, my own personalit
y, my own character, my o
wn
personal history mitigate 
the voice" (Lee, Intervie
w 162).
Lee's rose operates from 
this voice as a symbol of 
a fluid
identity that cannot be co
dified or specific to any
 given
gender, race, or person.
In tracing the symbolism 
of the rose, it is importa
nt
to recognize and remembe
r that this symbolism has 
been
defined by the phallocent
ric symbolic order. Beatr
ice
Susanne Bullock-Kimball sh
ows that the rose is the 
"re-
enactment of primal harmon
y in the first garden" (33
).
Throughout literary, mythol
ogical, and religious his
tory the
rose has held a place of 
superiority as symbol. S
eward goes
so far as to assert that 
the rose, "the queen of f
lowers, .
. remains ascendant in ima
ginative writing," (2) an
d that
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the "history of the ros
e [is] a history of sy
mbolism" (2).
In tracing the history
 of meaning in rose sym
bolism, Seward
shows that it is direct
ly linked to feminine p
rinciples,
that rose symbolism ofte
n began as love and the
n progressed
to woman, to female fert
ility, divine love, mot
herhood,
mother nature, mother co
untry, and from there e
volved into a
symbol of rebirth, life,
 joy, creation and etern
ity (6-7).
Bullock-Kimball also tra
ces the symbolism of the
 rose in
Greek myth, Alexandrian 
myth, early Christian th
ought, the
Roman de la Rose, Dante
, Romanticism, symbolist
 poetry,




In literary symbolism, t
he rose is inextricably
 linked
to the life instinct. Y
eats's rose alone was a 
feminine
symbol for harmony, but 
he preferred the Rosicru
cian rose,
which combined the cross
 and the rose, as the sy
mbol for the
Unity of Being he was at
tempting to represent. 
The
Rosicrucian rose "opens 
at the meeting of the tw
o beams of
the cross" (255) and rep
resents the union of man
's essence
with the omnipresent Ove
rsoul. Lee's rose, too,
 is once
found in union with the 
cross: "I planted roses
, for whose
table I harvested roses,
/who put his hand on my 
crown and
purified me/in the name o
f the Father, the Son, a
nd of the
Holy Ghost" (Rose 41).
J.E. Circlot's definitio
n of the rose as symbol
demonstrates its mythic a
nd associative power thr
oughout
literature:
finding many of the s
ame
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. [A] rose is . . . in essence a symbol of
completion, of consummate achievement and
perfection. Hence, accruing to it are all those
ideas associated with these qualities: the mystic
center, the heart, the Garden of Eros, the
Paradise of Dante, the emblem of Venus and so on .
. The relationship of the white rose and the
red is in accordance with the two colors as
defined in alchemy . . [w]hen the rose is round
in shape, it corresponds to the mandala.
(qtd. in Bullock-Kimball, 17)
The relationship between the theories of Yeats and Jung
has been investigated thoroughly in critical works. Ju
ng's
rose is a mandala symbol, and "since the mandala is to Tu
ng
the principal symbol of the completion or end of the
integrative process, the rose in his theory symbolizes
rebirth, psychic harmony, and the fulfillment of man's
being" (Seward 9). The same with Yeats's Rosicrucian rose
and the Unity of Being he wanted to achieve; as Bullock-
Kimball suggests, the "'far off, most secret and inviolat
e
Rose' of Yeats suggests a labyrinth, a mandala with a sec
ret
center' (31), that each individual or group/tribe seeks i
n
different places, although we know that the connection
between myth and the unconscious demonstrates a remarkably
constant set of symbols and tales.7
As these examples cf the literary, mythological, and
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psychological symbolism of the rose demonstrate, 
the rose
has been primarily relegated to a position among 
other
feminine binary principles, and some of the above
definitions and descriptions immediately set off 
alarms in a
feminist mind. In her discussion of Helene Cixous'
s idea of
a patriarchal binary thought, Moi lists Cixous's ex
amples of
binary oppositions: Activity/ Passivity, Sun/Moon,
Culture/Nature, Day/Night, Father/Mother, Head/Emot
ions,
Intelligible/ Sensitive, Logos/Pathos (104). Moi 
explains:
"Corresponding as they do to the underlying opposit
ion
man/woman, these binary oppositions are heavily imb
ricated
in the patriarchal value system: each opposition ca
n be
analyzed as a hierarchy where the 'feminine' side i
s always
seen as the negative, powerless instance" (104). T
he
possible problem with androgyny, then, is that in
distinguishing between these principles within a lite
rary
work and its symbols, do we only serve to reinforce t
he
hierarchy?
For the most part, I have discovered that Lee is
unusually adept at avoiding the pitfalls of patriarch
al
binary thought, and his rose is the best example of 
his
attempt, since his symbolic rose is neither essenti
ally
feminine nor masculine. In the 227-line poem in Rose
,
"Always a Rose," the rose shadows and participates 
in every
aspect of the speaker's life; it is with him throug
h every
move, conscious and unconscious. As in many of L
ee's poems,
42
the speaker frames the poem by beginning in the present with
an event or a thought reminding him of something from the
past, which he then relates, after which he returns to the
present, usually with an epiphany of sorts in tow, and
concludes the poem.
"Always a Rose" is divided into ten segments, the first
of which begins with the image of the rose:
What shape floats




on a long, spiked, crooked
stem. I know now,
as if I'd never known, this
black shape within the night's black shape. (37)
he speaker's introductory image informs us that he knows
now what the rose means, what it embodies; he understands it
now, and as the poem progresses he will internalize it,
embodying it himself. The rose is balanced on a phallic
spike, an element that is important, particularly since the
bloom is "balanced" on this spike. (The image could be used
as an excellent metaphor for the symbolic order in which the
rose as symbol is "balanced" by a phallocentric language.)
He finds the rose among a number of dead flowers, but the
rose--believed dead--still lives. He then tells us how each
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of his family members would treat this fragile flower:
Of my brothers
one would have ignored it,
another ravished it, the third
would have pinned it to his chest and
swaggered home.
My sister would rival its beauty,
my mother bow before it, then bear it
to my father's grave, where
he would grant it seven days,
then return and claim it forever.
I took it,
put it in water,
and set it on my windowsill. (37)
The males in the family would violate the rose, either by
force or indifference, whereas the females, to whom the
speaker more closely relates in this setting, would revere
it. As yet the reader has only this clue as to the
biological sex of the speaker--his reaction to the rose as
compared to the reaction of others would presumably make him
more like the "females."
In the next section of the poem, the speaker moves to
the past and begins to more fully explore the polarities
which the rose embodies. The past rushes by: "In the
procession of summers and the arrivals of days/the roses
marched by in a blur" (38). He remembers each of the events
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he recounts in terms of the rose, and it is 
"Always a
rose,/in prayer and in fever, in the sun a
nd in the den"
(38). These polarities involve all states
 of being: "the
opening to fullness and toward death" (38).
The rose then becomes a remedy for disunity
. When the
speaker sees "most clearly [the rose's] tr
ue nature" (39),
he sees its oppositions, but they soon beco
me a part of a
whole identity, as in the petals and folds
 of the rose:
When with arrows, night pierces you, rose.
I see most clearly
your true nature.
Small, auroral, your death is large.
You live, you die with me, in spite
of me, like my sleeping wife.
Lying here, with her at my right and you at
my left,
the dying lies between the dying.
Each finger is a brother or sister,
in each thumb is smudged the deaths I'm losin
g
count of.
The left palm is the forsythia that never
waved good-bye,
the right is my beloved pine dying from
something no one knew. (39)
As Barbara Walker points out, a great many 
myths allowed
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that the joining of right and left served as the hieros 
gamos, hierogamy, or sacred marriage of male and female
principles (531). In the context of this poem, the
polarities are noted but fundamentally united in the
speaker. The "her" at the speaker's right in this passage
is his wife, the sexual woman in his life, the woman who
accents his traditional manhood; the "you" at his left is
the rose. (This is the first clear indication that the sex
of the speaker is likely male.) The rose is like a wife in
the speaker's life, he is entwined with it, it is a part of
him. In his reverie he finds on the left a tree--where he
earlier found a rose--representing an immortal element which
"never waved good-bye"; on the right is a tree--where he
earlier found his w.,fe--representing a mortal element that
is "dying from something no one knew." His left and right
are separated but connected by his body, as the fingers and
thumbs he uses to represent siblings are separate but united
by his body. The body imagery in this segment is extensive,
and each image further explores the body's separateness and
connectedness, the sameness as well as the difference
between its features:
My arms and legs are the rain in its opulence,
my face is my mother's face.
My hair is also hers.
She inherited it from the horses
who recovered it from the night.
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Here is what is left: a little brown, bits of
black, a few specks
of light.
Here are my shoulders and their winglessness,
my spine, the arc of love. (39)
The rain in Lee's poetry is inextricably tied to the p
ersona
of the father, and since in this segment of the poem the
speaker is investigating physical inheritances and what t
hey
mean spiritually, we learn here that he has his father's
limbs and his mother's face and hair. The physical element
s
of the speaker are a combination of traits inherited by 
his
parents and shared by his siblings.
In looking back over these images we find them moving
increasingly closer to a "center." The speaker begins with
the fingers, moves in to the palms, then further in to t
he
arms and legs, then to the face and hair, then to the
shoulders, and then to the spine. What LY .Aiately follows
is the image of the speaker's center; significantly it is
also a dramatic exposition of the speaker's recognition of
his androgynous nature:
And here on my belly
is a stripe of skin, hairless
and the color of old blood.
Beginning at the navel, it descends into the
tangled hairs.
Vestige, omen, this is the stain
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which at my birth my father
traced with his finger
while pronouncing in dread
that I was born half girl.
So I was given the remedy of the rose,
made to eat you whole, swallow your medicinal
taste.
Before the honey, before
the salty crystal,
I knew your bitterness,
one part soil, two parts root, and all the
filaments of rain.
Question and answer in one
bud unfolding, you are what
the spade tastes with its sharp tongue,
what the earth utters in serious savors
more generous than salt, more memorable than
sweetness,
something with a shadow the weight of a man
fallen asleep during incessant prayer,
a good, grave, exquisite
bitterness. (39-40)
The above passage is not the only direct reference to
the androgynous nature of the speaker in Lee's poetry, but
it is probably the most striking because it is so literal.
48
It is also the one most directly linked to the elements of
the rose as a symbol. The sign of the androgynous nature o
f
the speaker, the "stripe of skin" at the center of the
speaker's being, begins at the navel, a symbolic mother
image, a symbol of regenerative nature, and ends in the
"tangled hairs" where the phallus, the primary male symbol,
rests. It is a "vestige" of something past, and it is an
"omen" of something to come; it literally connects the
anatomical symbols of male and female parentage, the
feminine and masculine principles of the physical body.8
In medical terms this is called the linea nigra, or black
line, and is caused by hormonal changes in women when they
are pregnant. To the father it is a sign that the child is
"nalf girl," a tragedy to the Christian patriarch who so
ioved the writings of the misogynist apostle Paul.
According to Walker, the three substances most commonly
related to resurrection or rebirth, most commrrnly associated
with the Mother Earth and mother womb, are blood, salt, and
honey (408), all three of which are found in the above
passage. In fact, the "'salt of the earth' [was] the true
blood of the Earth Mother" (887). The speaker's father is
hoping to resurrect the child as all male. The rose,
however, given to the child as a remedy, doesn't serve to
rid him of the feminine half; rather, it enmeshes the
feminine and the masculine, entwining the polaritieL; Ilkc an
oxymoron: "bitterness rich," "Question and answer in
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one/bud unfolding," "exquisite/bitterness."
The ingestion of the rose, then, the synthesis of the
speaker's "halves," continues into the fourth section:
Odorous and tender flower-
body, I eat you
to recall my first misfortune.
Little, bitter
body, I eat you
to understand my grave father.
Excellent body of layers tightly
wound around nothing,
I eat you to put my faith in grief.
Singed at the edges, dying
from the flame you live by, I
eat you to sink into
my own body. Secret body
of deep liquor,
I eat you
down to your secret. (40)
The misfortune in this poem is not that the speaker was
born half girl; rather, the misfortune is the "grave father"
who doesn't understand that these "halves" exist only in his
religious and societal culture, and that they exist as a
destructive force. Separation did not exist before society
and its fixed gender rules, and will not exist atter.
Indeed, in eating the rose the speaker finds a secret
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"nothing" within the folds of the rose, the nothing th
at
represents a primal harmony.9 It is again the moving
inward to find a center, a center in which the speaker is
androgynous. The image of eating is linked throughout Le
e's
poetry to acquiring various additions to an identity 
through
eating an "other," discussed further in Chapter Two.
Lee's poetry is most often compared to Rilke's in t
he
reviews that have been written. In investigating Rilk
e's
rose, John Mood discovers,
It is the plenitude of the nothing of both the
world-sleep in the center of the rose and the
vibrant inner-ness that dwells in the being of man
• • . It presents the union of inner and outer,
sleeping and waking, nothing and being (that
ancient philosophical contradiction), yes, and of
life and death. And the union of what is already
joined is accomplished through the motive power of
desire, the power which is desire. Yet a
contradiction remains, for the inner and outer are
not identical--the space is gone the minute one
peels away the petals. (109)
Rilke's rose represents both worlds, but primarily it
represents this "sinking" into the inner life--as Lee
"sinks" into his own body, moves toward its center,
searching for an identity.
Lee's rose is similar to Rilke's, and when the speaker
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eats it "down to [its] secret" he finds the "body of layers
tightly/wound around nothing." This "nothing" is no more a
void than is Rilke's inner world; it is, rather, the
identity that involves not only what is present, but what is
absent. The rose is "lonely for no one" (42) because it is
a whole identity.
It is an acceptance of polarities, a recognition of the
uniqueness of an identity that cannot be proscribed or
prescribed, which is at the center of one's being, that is
the remedy the speaker wishes to gift all his loved ones
with when in the next section of the poem he invokes a rose
for each of them, telling the reader to "Listen now to
something human" (41):
And there is one I love, who hid her heart
behind a stone.
Let there be a rose for her, who was poor,
who lived through ten bad years, and then ten
more,
who took a lifetime to drain her bitter cup.
And there is one I love, smallest among us--
let there be a rose for him--
who was driven from the foreign schoolyards .
• •
And there is one I love who limps over this
planet,
dragging her steel hip.
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Always a rose for her. (41)
Each of these people for whom the speaker wishes 
a rose has
been exiled in one fashion or another; exile is a kin
d of
division of self, a loss of a part of one's identit
y. One
"hid her heart behind a stone"; another was "dri
ven from the
foreign schoolyards"; another is crippled; another is
"lost/in another country." In the rose each of these 
exiled
and torn individuals will retrieve an essence of what
 is
lost, a comfortable sense of the uniquely full identity
 he
or she has lost. This is what the speaker hopes for 
his
father as well:
And always a rose for one I love
exiled from one republic and daily defeated in
another,
who was shunned by brothers and stunned by God,
who couldn't sleep because of voices,
who raised his voice, then his hand
against his children, against his children
going. For him a rose, my lover of roses and of
God,
who taught me to love the rose, and fed me
roses, under whose windows
I planted roses, for whose table I harvested
roses,
who put his hand on my crown and purified me
in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of
53
the Holy Ghost,
who said, Get out! You're no longer my son! 
who never said, Forgive me. Why do I die? Hold 
me, hold me.
My father among the roses and thorns.
My father rose, my father thorn. (41-2)
The opposing natures of the father are compared to those
 of
the rose, a flower of antinomies, of contraries, of
oppositions. The father fought against any union of
polarities, against his own identity, believing division 
is
necessary and good and right, that everything is absolut
e,
black and white. The speaker recognizes the polarities 
in
his father, and the gift of the rose would relieve the
father of the inner battle between natural polarities by
helping him accept them all. The most interesting irony
 is
that the father loves roses but doesn't understand them,
 a
"misfortune" the father hoped to likewise bestow on his son
.
In the next section of the poem the reader learns why
the speaker returned to his father's house after his own
exile:
Not for the golden pears, rotten on the ground--
their sweetness their secret--not for the scent
of their dying did I go back to my father's house.
Not for the grass
grown wild as his beard in his last months,
nor for the hard, little apples that littered the
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yard,
and vines, rampant on the porch, tying the door
shut,
did I stand there, late, rain arriving.
The rain came. And where there is rain
there is time, and memory, and sometimes
sweetness.
Where there is a son there is a father.
I said good-bye to the forsythia, flowerless for
years.
I turned from the hive-laden pine.
Then I saw it--you, actually.
Past the choked rhododendrons,
behind the perishing gladiolas, there
in the far corner of the yard, you, my rose,
lovely for nothing, lonely for no one,
stunning the afternoon
with your single flower ablaze.
I left that place, I let the rain
meditate on the brilliance of one blossom
quivering in the beginning downpour.
The speaker experiences his own exile, his own division of
self, and goes back to remedy that division, to find the
rose. The speaker finds his identity once more, letting the
rain, the father, meditate once more on the rose, embodied
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in his son, "quivering in the downpour" of his father.
In a dramatic crescendo of the poem, Lee returns to the
polarized elements in the speaker and to that speaker's plea
for some type of reconciliation:
If with my mouth,
if with my clumsy tongue, my teeth,
if with my voice, my voice
of little girl, of man, of blood, and if
with blood, if with marrow, if with groin,
lungs,
if with breath bristling with animal and
vegetable, if with all
the beast in me, all the beauty,




which passes, and if I do so until
all words are spoken, then
begin again,
if I adore you, Rose,
with adoration become nonsense become
praise, could I stop our dying?
Could we sit together in new bodies, shoulder
to tender shoulder,
the lovely and the thorned, the bitter and
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the failed,
the grave to the left of us, the sea to the
right?
Could you rise and stand and bear
the weight of all the names I would give you?
Cup of Blood, Old Wrath, Heart O'Mine,
Ancient of Days,
Whorl, World, Word.
0 day, come! (43-44)
This rose, unaware of its polarities and likewise
unaware of its seeming wholeness, the remedy the 
speaker
wants to invoke and bestow on all those he loves,
 can give
him the one thing missing: acceptance of himself 
and his
identity. If we are only halves, partial beings 
in one way
or another, because we refuse to accept all as
pects of our
identity, this is what destroys us. It also silenc
es the
poet; only after the poet accepts and names all t
he elements
of his identity, "little girl" and "man," "animal
" and
"vegetable," "beast" and "beauty," "lovely" and "th
orned,"
"left" and "right," can he hope to be reborn in a 
new, freer
body and to voice that freedom. Therefore, the r
ose serves
as a remedy by reconciling all opposing forces with
in, not
by destroying or denying chunks of oneself, as the 
father
wished him to do. In her review of this poem, Judi
th
Kitchen remarks on "Always a Rose":
. . Lee tollows a path of association, allowing
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the rose to surface in memory and to fill his
mouth with its bitter, medicinal taste. He takes
it in, transforms it into symbol, then moves in a
state of ecstasy to where he can make it wholly
his by naming it. (421)
The passage above begs the question, however, of the
effectiveness of language. If the speaker spoke all the
words, every one of them, could he change anything about who
or what he is? Can he even find the words to represent
himself adequately? As a poet, Lee is not only finding his
voice but trying to discover the limits of language; the
speaker in the poem is trying to find an identity as well as
the limits of the identity. Identity and language and the
voicing of oneself are inextricably tied, and we will see
further evidence of this in the discussion of "The Cleaving"
in Chapter Three.
Final! the speaker calls the rose his "meditation,
[his) recitative" (45), and ends the poem thus:
I love your nakedness.
Naked, shy flower, sweet
to my nose, and bitter
to my tongue, among
the dying things
are you and I. (45)
Naked but shy, sweet but bitter, alive and dying--the rose
consists of all its existing polarities; it is not governed
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by a culture's insistence on a fixed identity. Also, t
he
rose takes the place of language by being a "recitative
."
In "Always a Rose," the rose as remedy is introduced by
the father as a remedy with which to cut out or suppres
s any
feminine nature of the speaker. The speaker learns tha
t the
rose is a remedy with which to accept conflicting
principles--as well as the impossibility of naming them a
ll-
-and understand as far as possible the nature of identi
ty;
therefore, he accepts all principles as acceptable and is
therefore androgynous. More importantly, the speaker
relegates no principle to a marginal or inferior position
.
In "The Weepers," also in Rose, the theme of
reconciliation and acceptance is again a foil to destru
ctive
oppositions and their trail of amputated pieces of one'
s
identity. "Were it not for the rain," the speaker says
,
I'd lean against this tree, and admire the
beauty
of the weeping girls, the marble
twins who kneel together above a grave,
their white backs bent
in grief, their draped clothing conforming
here and there to the curve
of a breast, a hip, a thigh, while live
roses lie in their laps. (55)
Again, the rain--associated with the father and thus
 with a
denial of the feminine--is what keeps the speaker from 
the
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"weeping girls" with "roses . in their laps." This
image links the roses to the sexual natures of human
females. Despite the rain, however, the synthesis is
attempted:
There have been times when I
was the one on the left,
hands folded between her knees,
withdrawn, almost inconsolable,
and times I was the other,
who embraces her sister, kisses her
on the round shoulder.
At any time, both
live in me
like sister branches of one tree,
the comforter and the comforted. (55-6)
The left is "withdrawn" and unconscious; on the right is th
e
"other" who embraces. As in "Always a Rose" there is a
center point--the trunk of the treP that has the "sister
branches." Both are always there; both live in the speaker;
both exist as essential parts of a whole; both make up the
speaker's identity; both are same and different; neither is
more or less essential. They are the strong and the weak,
as is the speaker, who is, as well, the consoled and the
consoler; without both elements there could be no existence
for each:
I am the father who comforts
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his son, and I am the son
who returns in later years to give succor
to his father. I am the one
who walks among the dead,
and the one who waits
at home with warm bread and milk,
the way, I know, someone waits for 
me.10
(55-56)
Rather than the presence of one implying the absence of an
"other," the existence of one insists upon the existence of
the other. Additionally, the sameness insists upon
difference, and vice versa. Luce Irigaray suggests that the
phallogocentric discourse "reduce[s] all others to the
economy of same" (21). Lee's discourse does not suffer from
this reduction.
The speaker then shifts to the physical, human
relationship between man and woman, husband and wife:
I recall an afternoon
we lay together, she
curled sideways and atop me, my body
cradling hers, which had been growing
round with our second son.
Lying that way,
her full hip fit
so perfectly
between my hip bones,
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and with a gravity not unlike desire,
it conjured sadness
in my loins, almost pity. (56)
This provocative image of pregnancy coordinating with the
sexual union that produces that state of being--the man with
the woman, pregnant with the son, cradled in his own
abdomen, as if he is pregnant with her--is strikingly
similar to the image of the rose, its folds and petals
intertwining. There are myriad female and male images
trading places and in stasis, and there is no apparent
attempt to hierachize the elements of this being's identity;
again, there is no relegation of the principles and images
to essential sameness or essential difference. Still, there
is the rain keeping the speaker from the weepers:
0 weepers, stone
girls weeping stone tears,
will you never recover?
Were it not for the rain, I'd 1:nyer
and maybe I'd weep.
But I'll do neither today, while someone
waits for me, and the rain
touches me, touches us
over and over, changes each of us,
shoulders and hips, roses and stones,
my love and the world,
all things which fit well. (56)
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Lee's rose imagery and symbolism in Rose do not allow
for a hierarchizing of any principles because they are all
interdependent and without inherent or fixed
characteristics; in doing so, Lee is able to achieve what
Kristeva, Moi, Woolf, and others recommend--a deconstruction
of the oppositions of masculine and feminine principles.
There is no fundamental identity for a man or for a woman,
identity implying an acceptance of everything unique and
existent in one's being. It is in this way that Lee avoids
a posture of original difference between male and female
"halves," an important concern among feminists.
In The City in Which I Love You Lee's rose remains
symbolic, at times, but becomes more a symbol of the tension
between oppositions than a reconciliation and recognition;
it still embodies female and male elements, as well as other
oppositions, but it is less an acceptance of the differences
inherent in sameness that make up a unique identity than it
is an investigation of the possible destructiveness of the
failure to accept them. Thus, this rose is more problematic
in terms of binary thought, because the speaker does, albeit
subtly, attribute lesser and greater characteristics within
the makeup of the rose.
The speaker remarks on the tension between oppositions
in "Arise, Go Down":
I've become a scholar of cancellations.
Here, I stand among my father's roses
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and see that what punctures outnumbers what
consoles, the cruel and the tender never
make peace, though one climbs, though one
descends
petal by petal to the hidden ground
no one owns. (City 37)
If "the cruel and the tender never make peace," then u
nity
is impossible, as is the acceptance of an identity in wh
ich
no principle suffers because of the existence of the oth
er.
If unity is impossible, then the symbolic order, the
patriarchal binary thought, can easily maintain its cont
rol
by prescribing a gender hierarchy in which the female and
feminine is subjugated. It is this lack of equality, an
d
the assertion that "what punctures [thorns] outnumbers
what/consoles [bloom]" that makes feminists wary when
approaching a piece of literature that appears to be
positing an idea of a unity of being or of a sexually
undifferentiated identity. However, the speaker then
pauses,
[to] bow to roses, roses
his father raised, and admire them, for one
moment
unable, thank God, to see in each and
Pvery flower the world cancelling itself.
(38)
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It is the nature of oppositions in tension to cancel each
other out, the present/absent dichotomy, problematic for
feminists because the woman is always the "other" and
therefore the absent. Here, and elsewhere in City, the poem
becomes an exercise in recognizing and assimilating the
opposites within, an effort similar to Bly's concept of
"living in the opposites":
Living in the opposites does not mean
identifying with one side and then belittling
the other.
Rejoicing in the opposites means pushing
the opposites apart with our imaginations so
as to create space, and then enjoying the
fantastic music coming from each side. One
gets a sense of the power of that by sitting
between a sitar and a tabla when both are
giving off music. (Iron John 175)
This is strikingly similar to Irigaray's theory, lauded by
Weil: "What emerges . . is a new/old dream of symmetry
between the sexes: new, because it is articulated through
the affirmation of difference, rather than through the
complementarity of sameness" (167). What both theories fail
to address is the possibility that sameness and difference
can coexist without threat to either sex. Bly's image is
well and good as an ideal, but it is a difficult concept to
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maintain in a phallocentric literature and cul
ture; it is
similar to Lee's ideal of a neuter soul--unreali
stic in a
literature and language controlled by a patriarc
hy. As long
as the opposites are firmly in place and can be 
related and
relegated to a binary position, one--by virtue of
difference—can be considered superior, positive
, as opposed
to the inferior, negative "other." In order to 
avoid this
kind of hierarchy, each individual must have its
 unique
identity, unstructured or fixed on the basis of 
sex, race,
or any other constructed code of being, as Lee's
 speaker
often demonstrates itself.
Lee's earlier rose left no room for a hierarchy 
that
allows any principle to reign supreme over its c
ounterpart.
In fact, his earlier rose demonstrated that such
 a posture
is destructive by nature; his speaker deconstruc
ts opposing
natures and thereby reconciles them in a posture
 of healing
and fineing an identity.
11
In "Furious Versions," the first poem in City, Lee
attempts to again demonstrate the destructivenes
s of a
divided identity, and he again uses the rose in 
his effort.
However, this rose does not represent a unique ide
ntity
unencumbered by a patriarchal construct. The poem
 is
divided into seven sections, and tells the story of 
the
father similarly to "Always a Rose," but the speak
er is
angrier, less tolerant. The rose becomes active
 in its own
being and its own creation:
66
But I see these flowers, and they seize
my mind, and I
can no more un-see
them than I can un-dream
this, no more than
the mind can stop
its wandering over the things







that scaled the red brick
of my father's house in Pennsylvania.
What was its name?
Each bloom, unsheathed
in my mind, urges, Remember! 
The  Paul's Scarlet! (20)
This rose is a specific one; it is not a representative
symbol, but a specific image. It is named after the apostle
Paul, excessively divisive in his attitudes toward men and
women and misogynist in his insistence upon essential
difference between sexes, a believer in absolutes, in the
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chosen people, and as earlier emphasized, whom the speaker's
father revered. It therefore represents the patriarchal
culture. This rose does not heal even itself:
Outside [father's] window, his rose,
aphid-eaten, bad-weather-wracked,
stem and thorn,
crook and bramble groping,
gripping brick, each sickly
bloom uttering, I  shall not die! 
before it's dispersed. (22)
If the mind is this rose, this divided, divisive rose, then
there is an implied lack of a unity of principles in that
mind. Granted, the speaker is insinuating that this kind of
rose is diseased, but the problem still exists. Whether it
is the masculine or the feminine principles which are
revered or subjugated by the binary opposition isn't the
concern of the responsible feminist critic; the concern is
the very existence of an immutable binary thought system in
which either principle is relegated to a specific "side" and
in which the feminine always loses power, voice, and
adequate representation.
As an androgynous symbol, Lee's rose is representative
of an identity which repudiates a fixed structure.
Likewise, whatever "truth" he controls by his discourse is
monitored only by the speaker's unique and "corrupted"
identity, an identity which includes, but does not insist
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upon, a non-codified mixture of principles; in other words,
the patriarchal language and its gender constructs lose
power in Lee's poetry. He subverts the male-discourse not
by relegating the feminine to the unconscious, but by
denying the essential existence of either principle within a
given identity; he also subverts the male-discourse by
denying inherent sameness or difference based on gender. In
his efforts, Lee delivers the "authentically feminist"
speaker Moi prescribes (qtd. above, 12).
THE "OTHER"
Androgyny suggests . . . a
spectrum upon which human
beings choose their places
without regard to propriety
or custom.
--Carolyn Heilbrun
In The City in Which I Love You, Lee's second volume of
poems, an "other" often takes on a vitally important role in
the speaker's search for meaning in the world within and in
the world without, particularly in the speaker's attempt to
understand personal identity and the concept of identity.
There are two poems in which this other has a leading role.
In the title poem, the speaker is searching for an other,
and in "The Cleaving" the speaker is searching for identity
through consuming an other. In both poems, gender
principles and sexual characteristics are confused in the
speaker and in the other; neither identity nor the need for
the other in establishing identity has anything to do with
requiring a "half" or an other gender--in some instances it
is the absence of the other which defines and makes unique--
but both have to do with the myriad elements of identity
that includes a unique variety of principles. (In most
criticism, the capitalized Other indicates God as it is used
in Lacanian criticism, and the uncapitalized other indicates
the feminine other opposed to the masculine self in the
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binary thought system; I follow this precedent in my
discussion, using quotation marks only when signifying
direct references by Lee to an other.)
The event in "The Cleaving," framing the speaker's
contemplation about identity, is a visit to a butcher; the
butcher is slaughtering a hog:
He gossips like my grandmother, this man
with my face, and I could stand
amused all afternoon . .
Such a sorrowful Chinese face,
nomad, Gobi, Northern
in its boniness
clear from the high
warlike forehead
to the sheer edge of the jaw.
He c r my brother, but finer,
except for his left forearm, which is
engorged,
sinewy from his daily grip and
wield of a two-pound tool,
he's delicate, narrow-
waisted, his frame
so slight a lover, some
rough other
might break it down
its smooth, oily length.
He could be my grandfather;
come to America to get a Western education
in 1917, but too homesick to study,
he sits in the park all day, reading poems
and writing letters to his mother. (77-8)
The butcher is compared to grandmother, grandfather, and
brother. Here, the "other" is specifically imaged as a
lover, but what makes that image interesting is its
similarity to the image that follows of the butcher
quartering the hog. The hog is greasy, like the butcher in
the above image in which his lover "break[s] him down"--his
"smooth, oily length"--and the butcher in the next segment
"slits the body/open, groin/to breast" (78). The "other" in
the previous segment, then, is like the butcher, and the
butcher becomes the lover.
The above image and the following segment sets up a
series of questions about the confusion of identity and the
role of an other in it. The head of the hog, flung from the
body, opens
down the middle where the butcher
cleanly halved it between the eyes,
and I see, foetal-crouched




The brain of the hog is thus compared to a fetus, which is
subsequently compared to the speaker:
Did this animal, after all, at the moment
its neck broke,
image the way his executioner
shrinks from his own death?
Is this how
I, too, recoil from my day?
Se how this shape
hordes itself, see how
little it is.
See its grease on the blade.
Is this how I'll be found
when judgement is passed, when names
are called, when crimes are tallied? (79)
The executioner is also compared to the fetus-like brain and
its fear of death. The speaker continues:
This is also how I looked before I tore my mother
open.
Is this how I presided over my century, is this
how
I regarded the murders?
This is also how I prayed.
Was It me in the Other
I prayed to when I prayed?
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This too was how I slept, clutching my wife.
Was it me in the other I loved
when I loved another?
The speaker is like the fetus/brain/executioner/butcher at
death, at birth, at prayer, and in love. He asks if he
loved himself in the "Other" when he prayed--did he love
himself in God? He asks if he loved himself in his wife.
In trying to love the self in the other, doesn't the speaker
then subvert its very otherness? I think so; this is one of
the major differences in Lee's androgynous ideal and that of
previous literary and mythological androgynes. Lee's
speaker has deconstructed the very idea of otherness, albeit
by first representing the phallocentric structure of an
other.
The brain of the hog subsequently becomes an other for
the speaker:
The butcher sees me eye this delicacy.
With a finger, he picks it
out of the skull-cradle
and offers it to me.
I take it gingerly between my fingers
and suck it down.
I eat my man. (79-80)
The line, "I eat my man," is problematic on first reading.
Is he talking about his humanness or his maleness or
something altogether different? Only later in the poem does
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the reader learn that the speaker "eats" things--
specifically "other" things--in order to "utter" them and
make them part of his identity through his poetry; as in
"Always a Rose," identity and language are involved in a
complicated dance. In the meantime, the next segment
discovers the soul:
The noise the body makes
when the body meets
the soul over the soul's ocean and penumbra
is the old sound of up-and-down, in-and-out,
a lump of muscle chug-chugging blood
into the ear; a lover's
heart shaped tongue;
flesh rocking flesh until flesh comes;
the butcher working
at his block to marry their shapes
by violence and time;
and engine crossing,
re-crossing salt water, hauling
immigrants and the junk
of the poor. These
are the faces I love, the bodies
and scents of bodies
for which I long
in various ways, at various times . . (80)
Thus, the noises that are the same are the body meeting 
the
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soul, lover meeting lover, butcher cutting and marrying
"shapes," and immigrants changing homes. When he talks
about his family of fellow Chinese, he separates and links
them:
Brothers and sisters by blood and design,
who sit in separate bodies of varied shapes,
we constitute a many-membered
body of love.
In a world of shapes
of my desires, each one here
is a shape of one of my desires, and each
is known to me and dear by virtue
of each one's unique corruption
of those texts, the face, the body . (81)
As discussed in the introduction, this passage both
separates humans by their physical bodies, but joins them by
virtue of those very bodies; sameness and difference again
must coexist. In the "world of shapes" of the speaker's
"desires," each of these people constitutes one, and that
one is it's "unique corruption" which the speaker wants to
make, or re-make, part of his identity. He celebrates the
difference and then takes it further in defining the souls
of these people:




of a text, but, thus, it
acquires salience, although a
human salience, but
inimitable, and, hence, memorable.
God is the text.
The souls is a corruption
and a mnemonic. (81-2)
Both the soul and the body are imperfect corruptions of a
"text" which we will later learn does not have a fixed or
codified gender:
I thought the soul an airy thing.
I did not know the soul
is cleaved so that the soul might be restored.
Live wood hewn,
its sap springs from a sticky wound.
No seed, no egg has he,
whose business calls for an axe.
In the trade of my soul's shaping,
he traffics in hews and hacks. (86)
Here, God is like the butcher; he corrupts the "text." The
speaker, the poet, also corrupts the text when he proceeds
to eat an other in order to "utter" it. He--God, the
butcher, the speaker--has neither "seed" nor "egg," no
gender. There is neither room for--nor possibility of--
hierarchizing elements in his business.
As mentioned above, Lee's speaker eats to internalize
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the elements of what is being eaten in order to translate
it. He eats a fish and discovers,
Whole unto itself, complete
without me, yet its
shape complements the shape of my mind.
I take it as text and evidence
of the world's love for me,
and I feel urged to utterance,
urged to read the body of the world, urged
to say it in human terms,
my reading a kind of eating, my eating
a kind of reading,
my saying a diminishment, my noise
a love-in-answer.
What is it in me would
devour the world to utter it?
What is it in me will not let
the world be, would eat
not just this fish,
but the one who killed it,
the butcher who cleaned it.
I would eat the way he
squats, the way he
reaches into the plastic tub . . . (82)
The speaker goes on to describe the butcher's cleaning ot
the fish, and then describes eating the Chinese race,
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Emerson, and the fish's head, before explaining why:
I bring it to my mouth and--
the way I was taught, the way I've watched
others before me do--
with a stiff tongue lick out
the cheek-meat and the meat
over the armored jaw, my eating,
its sensual, salient nowness,
punctuating the void








architecture, this carp head,
but one more
articulation of a single nothing
severally manifested. (83-4)
There are at least two ways to read this "void" and this
"nothing." It is obviously an absence of something that
makes the speaker want to eat it, to internalize it, to
"utter" it. Again, in the utterance and in the eating the
79
otherness is subverted. Neither the void nor the hunger is
ever permanently appeased or permanently absent. The fish
is another example of a "single nothing/severally
manifested." The one nothing is manifested in everything.
Lee uses this image to write about change being another clue
to the inevitability of death, but he also compares our
eating of each other to God's eating of us:
Bodies eating bodies, heads eating heads,
we nothing eating nothing,
and though we feast,
are filled, overfilled,
we go famished.
We gang the doors of death.
That is, our deaths are fed
that we may continue our daily dying,
our bodies going
down, while the plates-soon-empty
are passed around, that true
direction of our true prayers,
while the butcher spells
his message, manifold,
in the mortal air.
He coaxes, cleaves, brings change
before our very eyes, and at every
moment of our being.
As we eat we're eaten.
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Else what is this
violence, this salt, this
passion, this heaven? (86)
If we are not being eaten in order to be 
"uttered" or
internalized by God, why else do we suffer? why 
else do we
feel pleasure? God, then, is filling a voi
d as well:
What then may I do
but cleave to what cleaves me.
I kiss the blade and eat my meat.
I thank the wielder and receive,
while terror spirits
my change, sorrow also.
The terror the butcher
scripts in the unhealed
air, the sorrow of his Shang
dynasty face,
African face with slit eyes. He is
my sister, this
beautiful Bedouin, this Shulamite,
keeper of sabbaths, diviner
of holy texts, this dark
dancer, this Jew, this Asian, this one





this man with my own face. (
86-7)
As a sister, and as any other
 representation listed, the
butcher is other, but as rep
resentative of the world's hum
an
element in every facet, the ma
n is also the speaker, who,
having eaten all these many iden
tities, finds an identity
that denies separateness but c
elebrates difference. In the
interchanging of identities, 
in the impermanence of any
specific identity, in the refu
sal to name essential sameness
or difference, the speaker sub
verts any otherness that might
be constructed by a culture 
or society. Language, that
patriarchally controlled mode 
of communication, ultimately
fails to name or circumscribe 
identity.
In "The City in Which I Love Yo
u" the lover as sister
and the sister as "other" is th
e principle image.12 The
poem, however, deals with the 
speaker's identity, and with
the search for an other whose 
very otherness is questioned.
The epgraph for the poem is f
rom Song of Songs, the chapter
from the Bible which heavily i
nfluences the poem:
I will arise now, and go about
 the city in the
streets, and in the broad ways
 I will seek
whom my soul loveth. (3:2)
"City," like The Song, and lik
e the poems discussed
above, is an exploration of a n
umber of questions about
identity: the consumption of 
an other in order to name it
and to make it part of the speake
r's identity, the nature of
exile, the presence/absence di
chotomy, questions of
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separateness and connectedness, difference and sameness, and
the search for meaning.
Unlike the poems mentioned above, "City" is not framed
by an evident event from the present. Instead, it is a trip
into the city of exile, the city of exiled, the city of what
is lost and found. It begins,
And when, in the city in which I love you,
even my most excellent song goes unanswered,
and I mount the scabbed streets,
the long shouts of avenues,
and tunnel sunken night in search of you • • •
[I] drag my extinction in search of you .
Past the guarded schoolyards, the boarded-up
churches, swastikaed
synagogues, defended houses of worship, past
newspapered windows of tenements, among the
violated,
the prosecuted citizenry, throughout this
storied, buttressed, scavenged, policed
city I call home, in which I am a guest . • •
(51)
The city in which the speaker is searching is any city under
a siege of political or social tyranny; the song is the
voice of the speaker, again trying to utter itself and its
•
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identity. It is a city the speaker calls "home" 
because it
is his residence, but a city in which he is a 
"guest"
because of his refugee status. The line, "I/drag m
y
extinction in search of you . • • ," can be read 
two ways.
If he is hauling his extinction, he is either already
extinct or is facing his coming extinction, and in fi
nding
the "you," which becomes synonymously an other, 
he can
reverse or ward off that extinction; on the other han
d, if
he is searching for his extinction, as if dragging a 
river
for a lost body, then he is searching for his own i
dentity
in the other. There is perhaps a hint on the facing 
page,
in the latter part of the previous poem, "This Room
 and
Everything in It" (49). In using his lover's body 
as a
mnemonic, the speaker says, "My body is estrangemen
t./This
desire, perfection./Your closed eyes my extinction" (
50).
If the lover's "closed eyes" are the speaker's e
xtinction,
then he must exist only through her existence;
 however, as
the poet, as the speaker, hi.- poem and his mnemonic
--in
fact, his words--ensure her existence. Therefore, it
 is a
matter of presence presupposing absence, and vice ver
sa;
one's existence relies on the existence of the other.
There is further evidence for the latter reading in t
he
remainder of "The City." The speaker must have the "
other"
to exist, yet the other's absence is limiting. 
Following





in the muscle, you
impinge upon me.
As bone hugs the ache home, so
I'm vexed to love you, your body
the shape of returns, your hair a torso
of light, your heat
I must have, your opening
I'd eat, each moment
of that soft-finned fruit,
inverted fountain in which I don't see me.
My tongue remembers your wounded flavor.
The vein in my neck
adores you. A sword
stands up between my hips,
my hidden fleece sends forth its scent of human
oil.
The shadows under my arms,
I promise, are tender, the shadows
under my face. Do not calculate,
but come, smooth other, rough sister. (51-2)
The violent imagery in these stanzas is difficult to
reconcile with the imagery of lovemaking; the other is a
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"bruise" that "impinge[s]" upon the speaker and he is
"vexed" to love her. Nevertheless, the speaker wants to
"eat" the "fruit" of her, an image we have seen is
indicative of the speaker's desire to make what he is eating
a part of his identity. He goes on the say a "sword/stands
up between my hips," attributing violence to the phallus, at
the same time going on to say his "shadows" are "tender."
Likewise, the lover is a contradiction: "smooth other, rough
sister." Certainly, from a feminist perspective, the
relationship between violence and sex is frightening and
disconcerting, and interpreting it as anything less than
unnerving is not my intention. However, as we will see
later in this poem, the "other" is significantly related to
the city from which the speaker has been exiled, from which
he has been divided, as he has been exiled and divided from
the "other"; significantly, thesc divisions have been forced
upon the speaker by the ruling order, a pat-LIrchal ruling
order. Thus, he is "vexed" to love his homeland--even while
he is forcibly separated from it; it is an integral and
necessary part of his identity. He may well be "vexed" that
the other is other at all.
The speaker continues to speak to the "other":
Yet how will you know me
among the captives, my hair grown long,
my blood motley, my ways trespassed upon:-
86
In the uproar, the confusion
of accents and inflections,
how will you hear me when I open my 
mouth?
Look for me, one of the drab popul
ation
under fissured edifices, fractured
artifices. Make my various
names flock overhead,
I will follow you.
Hew me to your beauty.
Stack me in the unaccountable fire,
bring on me the iron leaf, but tende
rly.
Folded one hundred times and
creased, I'll not crack.
Threshed to excellence, I'll achieve y
ou. (52-3)
The speaker's blood is "motley," mul
ticolored and
heterogeneous; he is living in a world
 where voices are
confused by various "accents and infle
ctions" and people
live in "fissured edifices, fractured/
artifices"; he has
"various names." Language is again in
adequate. The
speaker's identity, like the city and 
the "other," cannot
therefore be fixed or codified or ev
en verbalized. The
duality of "cleaving" in Lee's poetr
y has been discussed
above, and there is likewise a dual..
ty in "hew," "fire,"
"fold," and "threshed," in the passa
ge above; these
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seemingly violent images are images of what the speaker
requires in order to make the "you" or the "other" a part of
his identity.
After further describing the violence of the city and
its oppressiveness, the speaker continues to speak to the
designated "other":
In the excavated places,
I waited for you, and I did not cry out.
In the derelict rooms, my body needed you,
and there was such flight in my breast.
During the daily assaults, I called to you,
and my voice pursued you,
even backward
to that other city
in which I saw a woman
squat in the street
beside a body,
and fan with a handkerchief flies from its face.
That woman




that man was not me;
his wound was his, his death not mine.
And the soldier
who fired the shot, then lit a cigarette:
he was not me.
And the ones I do not see
in cities all over the world,
the ones sitting, standing, lying down, those
in prisons playing checkers with their knocked-out
teeth:
they are not me. Some of them are
my age, even my height and weight;
none of them is me.
The woman who is slapped, the man is kicked,
the ones who don't survive,
whose names I do not know;
they are not me forever,
the ones who no longer live
in the cities in which
you are not,
the cities in which I looked for you. (53-5)
Here, the speaker's insistence that these people are not him
implies that although "they are not [him] forever," he could
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be any one of them, and vice
 versa. Here otherness t
akes on
a different value, and links
 the lover to thcse who ar
e not
the speaker, yet could be at 
any given moment:
If I feel the night
move to disclosures and cresce
ndos,
it's only because I'm famished
for meaning; the night
merely dissolves.
And your otherness is perfect
 as my death.
Your otherness exhausts me,
like looking suddenly up from 
here
to impossible stars fading.
Everything is punished by yo
ur absence.
The speaker is not only searc
hing for meaning, he is
"famished" for it, wants to
 eat it and make it part of h
im.
As discussed in the introdu
ction, the "otherness" in th
is
passage seems to be a questio
n of the necessity of the v
ery
"otherness" he is punished 
by. The simile implies that 
the
"other," like the stars, se
ems "impossible" from where t
he
speaker stands, yet even in t
he impossibility, the fadin
g of
the stars is somehow worse.
 If the stars we see are
impossible, then what about t
he ones we don't see? Do they
even exist at all after they 
have faded? In returning t
o
the earlier question of the
 implication in the line, "I
 drag
my extinction in search of
 you," there is a common e
lement;
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the existence of one necessitates the 
existence of the
other; therefore, how can either be mo
re important or vital?
For that matter, how can either be nam
ed? "Otherness,"
then, is exhausting by virtue of being
 forced to be "other"
when, in fact, it is necessary for ide
ntity. Their very
otherness is remarkably their sameness.
How does the mind deal with this kind of
 inquiry and
search for meaning and identity? One wa
y, the speaker
suggests, is through prayer, though pray
er, too, solicits
its own questions:
Is prayer, then, the proper attitude
for the mind that longs to be freely blo
wn,
but which gets snagged on the barb
called world, that
tooth-ache, the actual? What prayer
would I build? And to whom?
Where are you
in the city in which I love you,
the cities daily rising to work and no 
money,
to the magnificent miles and the gold 
coasts? (55)
It is the "barb/called world" that force
s the "other" to be
"other," denying the mind its freedom to
 be, simply, what it
is. Would prayer, to whomever, help or 
hurt? The search
continues:
You are not in the wind
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which someone notes in the m
argins of a book.
You are gone out of the sma
ll fires in abandoned
lots
where human figures huddle,
each aspiring to its own gho
st.
Between brick walls, in a sp
ace no wider than my
face,
a leafless sapling stands in
 mud.
It its branches, a nest of r
aw mouths
gaping and cheeping, scrawny 
fires that must eat.
My hunger for you is no less
 than theirs. (56)
Each "human" wants to achiev
e his/her "ghost," implying
"other," "soul," or "immorta
lity," all of which imply an
oppressive dua11ty of being
. The birds, like fire, mus
t eat
to survive; the speaker, lik
e the birds, must have the
"other" to survive. The fol
lowing stanza is a metaphor
describing the relentless pa
ssion to approach the city--
and
the "other"--and the subsequ
ent rebuttal:
At the gates of the city in 
which I love you,
the sea hauls the sun on its 
back,
strikes the land, which rebuk
es it.
What ardor in its sliding hef
t,
a flameless friction on the 
rocks.
Like the sea, I am recommend
ed by my orphaning.
92
Noisy with telegrams not r
eceived,
quarrelsome with aliases,
intricate with misguided j
ourneys,
by my expulsions have I co
me to love you. (56)
As the sea is turned away b
y the land, so is the spea
ker
turned away by the city, th
e "other," and in the very
"orphaning" the speaker fin
ds he is favored, "recomme
nded"
even. It is the exile and 
the division from a signifi
cant
part of himself which has l
ed him to love that from w
hich he
is separated.
In the final stanzas of the
 poem, the speaker
reconciles with his state 
of exile, his city, and his
 other:
Straight from my father's w
rath,
and long from my mother's 
womb,
late in this century and o
n a Wednesday morning,
bearing the mark of one who
's experienced
neither heaven nor hell,
my birthplace vanished, my 
citizenship earned,
in league with stones of t
he earth,
enter, without retreat or h
elp from history,
the days of no-day, my eart
h
of no-earth, I re-enter
the city in which I love yo
u.
And I never believed that
 the multitude
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of dreams and many words were 
vain. (56-7)
There is a specific singularity
 in the incident relayed
above. The speaker seems to h
ave been exiled by his fathe
r-
-"Straight from my father's wr
ath"--but whether this is a
result of his father's exile o
r his own is not discernible
.
What is clear is that the spea
ker is entering the city wit
h
a past that is likewise not di
scernible. He enters it with
a clear and unfettered mind--a
 "free-blown mind" in fact.
The dreams and the words are no
t futile because they alone
have helped the speaker achieve
 the awareness of his
identity. This identity requi
res acceptance, mostly, but
also its own awareness of the 
futility of denying itself by
denying that which is necessar
y for its existence. It is,
after all, the dreams and the 
words which have led him to
the search; the very nature of
 searching implies that the
speaker is without that for wh
ich he searches, but perhaps
the search is more important t
han whatever is found. Words,
language, and dreams are fleet
ing things, intangible and
inadequate, but they are often
 all we have with which to
communicate with others and ev
en with ourselves.
In her informative and thought
ful study of the Song,
Frances Landy approaches it fr
om the address, "my sister, my
spouse," and suggests that the 
male and female "unite .
to form the collective human pe
rsonality" (313). As in
Lee's poem, the "sister," "spou
se," "other," correlates with
the city or the kingdom:
94
There is also an opposition between the woman
 and
the country; she is its equivalent, and its
 rival
for the King's attentions. As prisoner of he
r
hair, he is emblematic of the vulnerability o
f
kings, and hence of the whole body politic, to
sexuality, the ultimate power of women that i
s the
object of repression. (315)
Lee's speaker returns as he must, just as any of t
he
millions of people in the world exiled in one w
ay or
another, the feminine exiled to the hidden or posi
tion of an
other, the citizen tormented by one government 
institution
or another, killed by one bullet or another; the 
speaker is
any man or woman; the speaker is Everyman and--no
t or--
Everywoman. It is this theme that throughout lite
rary
history has promoted the best notions of androgyny
: the
human as human first, born of man and woman, and e
ach
unique. ti1l, this search for the "other" remain
s in any
city in he world, particularly in any patriarcha
l city in
the world. She must always hide in these cities;
 she must
always hide in the recesses of the psyche, or else s
he will
be punished, as is the Beloved in the Song: "The 
watchmen
that went about the city found me, they smote me,
 they
wounded me; the keepers of the walls took away my
 veil from
me" (5:7). In Lee's poem the speaker as speaker--an
d the
speaker as other--suffers "daily assaults" (53), 
becomes
"The woman who is slapped, the man who is kicke
d,/the ones
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who don't survive . . . (54), is 
always "famished/for
meaning" (55) and for freedom fro
m tyranny, whether tyranny
of the father, the king, the lover
, or the conscious mind.
Landy points out that although in
 the Song the "Beloved
reverses the patriarchal theology 
of the Bible" (317), she
is punished for her attempt to gr
ab her freedom, just as all
freedom grabbers are punished in p
atriarchal societies. The
speaker in Lee's poem is also sear
ching for freedom, for any
and all freedom, and somehow that 
freedom is inherent in the
existence of the "other."
As Landy demonstrates, in the Song
 integration is never
achieved--it can't be--and "each 
episode moves toward a
climax that cannot be fulfilled in
 the poem" (316). It is
also a song, like Lee's song, tha
t cannot truly be
communicated. Lee's speaker cann
ot communicate his identity
with language; how, then, can the 
culture use language to
fix identities? Ultimately, howev
er, the Song is a
criticism of a world which doesn't
 understand that the
greatest wisdom is love and accept
ance of that which is
unique in each citizen, and that t
he most dangerous enemy of
wisdom is a tyrant--by any of a th
ousand names--who denies
uniqueness in identity by attempti
ng to force a fixed
identity onto anyone. In Lee's po
etry, as in the world of
the Song, the attempt to understan
d and accept uniqueness
against the onslaught of tyranny is
 the bravest thing 3f
all.
CONCLUSION
[A] few fugitive observations.
--Carolyn Heilbrun
As an avid proponent of l'ecriture
 feminine, or women's
writing, Helene Cixous suggests that
 women's primary goal at
this time should be to write them
selves back into the text
from which they have been deleted or
 in which they have been
falsely represented. This suggestio
n is appropriately
dictated inasmuch as history and s
ociety have failed to
represent women truthfully, and th
is thesis was not designed
to deny the importance of women's 
writing; in fact, in my
creative writing my primary goal i
s to represent women
accurately and honestly. Neverthe
less, I am also interested
in what effect the women's movemen
t and the burgeoning
women's studies programs in academ
e have had on the work of
younger male artists. If attit,ide
s in male artists are
changing in any positive way, 1 
uld behoove us to know
how and why so we can ensure the con
tinuation and blossoming
of that positive transformation. 
Cixous suggests that
"woman must write woman. And man, 
man. Sc only an oblique
consideration will be found here of 
man; it'.- up to him to
say where his masculinity and femini
nity are at:: this will
concern us once men have opened thei
r eyes and seen
themselves clearly" (Mod. Fem. 198
). In my ,.,rinion, Lee's
attempt to do just that deserves a
ttention; as womcn, we
96
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certainly don't want to have our eyes closed and miss 
it if
and when men do open theirs, even if it is only one man a
t a
time.
I have called Lee's voice androgynous because of his
exploration of the relationship between identity and other.
Cixous insists that there is "no invention possible, whether
it be philosophical or poetic, without the presence in the
inventing subject of an abundance of the other, of the
diverse: persons-detached, persons-thought, peoples born of
the unconscious, and in each desert, suddenly animated, a
springing forth of self that we did not know about" (New
French Feminisms 97). This active interaction between an
active self and an active other, a commingling that does not
fix or codify identity traits on the basis of gender, a
commingling that creates a being as well as it recognizes a
n
existent being, and thus makes difference celebratory while
effectively denying power to those who would use it against
the different, is the kind of androgyny I believe Lee's
speaker embodies.
In Luce Irigaray's schema "Moman would always remain
multiple, but she would be protected from dispersion because
the other is a part of her, and autoerotically familiar to
her. That does not mean that she would appropriate the
other for herself, that she would make it her property" (New
French Feminisms 104). Again, I believe this definiti
on of
identity is androgynous, perhaps not in a traditional sen
se,
98
but certainly in essence.
The problem with traditional androgyny i
n literature,
as discussed in my introduction, is well
 defined by Kari
Weil:
The androgyne is at once a real, empiric
al subject
and an idealized abstraction, a figure o
f
universal Man. Defined as a union of mas
culine
and feminine, the androgyne figures, furt
hermore,
the dialectical synthesis of what is obje
ctively
known (identified as the masculine) and t
he
unknown Other (identified as feminine) wh
o will
make that knowledge complete. (2)
I have not purposely attempted to dispute
 the problematic
dimensions of this traditional androgyn/
. Nor have I
attempted to disparage differences betwe
en men and women, or
insinuate that Lee disparages those diffe
rences. In his
poetry, Lee celebrates difference as wel
l as sameness, and
certainly hope my critique does likewise.
The differences inscribed by the patriar
chy and the
phallocentricism of language and canonica
l literature have
served the symbolic order and its hierar
chy well. In a
recent television news talk show, two lea
ders of the men's
movement championed difference, but somet
hing one of them
said disturbed me. He declared that when
 women tried to act
like men they suffered a higher than norm
al incidence of
health problems such as heart disease an
d substance abuse,
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and when men tried to act like women they bec
ame unable to
function adequately in society. In celebrating 
difference,
then, he wanted to maintain the traditional b
ehavior that
has been patriarchally prescribed for the sex
es, and thus he
missed the point of feminism and the women's 
movement
altogether; we should all know by now how destr
uctive that
prescription has been for women and for men. Howe
ver, if I
cannot comfortably support the divisiveness many 
factions of
the men's movement encourage, then I cannot s
upport any
reverse divisiveness encouraged by women. New 
York Times
columnist Anna Quindlen recently commented that
 sometimes
she thought the women's movement had raised t
he
consciousness of the wrong sex; in other words, 
it's time to
raise the consciousness of men. A raised consciou
sness
among males seems especially necessary right now 
when
considering the data being gathered about sexual 
harrassment
in our public school systems.
I believe we must celebrate uniqueness--any and al
l
uniqueness whether based on sex, race, religion, h
opes,
dreams, or loves--and I assume that celebration 
presupposes
a celebration of difference. We should not, howe
ver,
celebrate difference merely because it is diffe
rent--that
would only reinforce a hierarchy; the properties o
f each
person's uniqueness that most merit a celebrati
on are its
fluidity, its heterodoxy, and its refusal to 
be
circumscribed by any order.
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Notes
1. Kristeva's deconstruction of the oppositi
ons because
they are metaphysical constructions differs i
n intent from
Bazin's argument; Kristeva finds the metaphys
ical
unsatisfactory while Bazin finds it a satisfa
ctory
explanation for the difference between androg
yny and
hermaphroditism. See Weil, pp. 151-2, and Moi, 
pp. 12-13.
2. In Refusing to be a Man, John Stoltenberg 
insists that
"pornography tells lies about women. But por
nography tells
the truth about men" (121).
3. I found it utterly fascinating that so ma
ny gynocritics
and essentialists find deconstruction and femin
ism
compatible, yet refuse to use deconstruction as
 Derrida has
used it to deconstruct sexual differences. W
ell went so far
as to suggest that the androgyne performs "a co
ntinuing act
of deconstruction on the text itself" (75), b
ut goes on to
find the androgyne anti-feminist because it
s "otherness" is
excluded or repressed. Well finds the androgyn
e a denial of
difference and believes that it "prioritizes a ma
sculine
perspective" (94). I find it difficult to beli
eve that an
image which denies difference prioritizes a dif
ference which
doesn't exist.
4. Heilbrun's discussion of women's autobiogra
phies and
biographies in Writing a Woman's Life includes th
is
observation: "What [Teresa de Lauretis) is rec
ommending is
the 'practice of self-consciousness,' the 'poli
tical,
theoretical, self-analyzing practice by which the 
relations
of the subject in social reality can be reartic
ulated from
the historical experience of women.' To put it
 simply, we
must begin to tell the truth, in groups, to one a
nother.
Modern feminism began that way, and we have los
t, through
shame or fear of ridicule, that important collect
ive
phenomenon" (45). Heilbrun has no problem with w
omen's
bodies, women's experiences, or women's truths. 
What she
obviously does take with is that although w
omen's
experiences may be historically, socially, and bi
ologically
different than men's doesn't mean her experiences m
ust
continue to be radically constructed, controlled,
 and
represented by the same patriarchy that set it up 
that way.
5. It is interesting to note, in view of my disc
ussion of
presence/absence in Chapter Three, that the light
 could not
exist without the dark.
6. Bullock-Kimball is able to show how Rilke's
 rose is used
as symbol in some instances and metaphor in oth
ers, although
she stresses that "the symbol and metaphor are 
interrelated
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6. Bullock-Kimball is able to show how Rilke's rose is used
as symbol in some instances and metaphor in others, although
she stresses that "the symbol and metaphor are interrelated
and act in concert: the former creates order in the world,
the latter integrates the world in its totality into the
illuminated self" (16). The same will be shown to be true
of Lee's rose.
7. Jung's psychoanalytic theories lend themselves well to
literary theory because his collective unconscious includes
all people, all religions, all genres of art, and because
each of us can readily understand the skeletal paradigm of
the theory. In his investigation of the mandala symbol,
Jung finds that it is prevalent and primary in the
unconscious mind of all human beings. He writes over and
over again that the "mandala shows, then, the union of all
opposites, and is embedded between yang and vin [the Taoist
equivalent], heaven and earth; the state of everlasting
balance and immutable duration" (CW, 9i, 358). This idea
relates to the binary oppositions of everything from the
male/female opposition to the heaven/earth opposition to the
conscious/unconscious opposition. Jung's penchant for the
symbol of the yin and yang serves him well because the
oppositions aren't separate. Huston Smith describes the
Chinese mandala symbol of yin/yang:
. . . [T]hough the halves are in tension,
they are not flatly opposed; they complement and
balance in each other. Each invades the
other's hemisphere and takes up its abode in the
deepest recesses of its partner's domain. And in
the end both find themselves resolved by the
circle that surrounds them, the Tao in its eternal
wholeness. In the context of that wholeness, the
opposites appear as no more than phases in an
endless cycling process, for each turns
incessantly into its opposite, exchanging places
with it. (214)
It is this synthesis, or individuation, that Jung
believed the psyche strives for, and the mandala is a symbol
of this harmony. In order to have this synthesis in life or
in poetry, it is essential that the feminine and masculine
qualities be equally accepted. Only after the feminine
principle, the Mysterious Hidden Woman (or as she's
variously called the Mysterious Female, Shakti, Sophia,
Aphrodite, the Delicate One, Moon, as well as myriad other
names), is accepted and delivered can association be
achieved.
"One real joy of poetry," Bly suggests, "is to
experience . . . leaping inside a poem" (47). This leaping
is another term for the associative value discussed above in
which "the poet is following some arc of association that
corresponds to the inner life of the objects he or she
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speaks of . . . . [which are] not private to the poet, but
are somehow inherent in the universe" (47). Again, this is
relevant to Jung's collective unconscious, Yeats's Great
Memory, or Blake's Memorable Fancy in The Marriage of Heaven
and Hell, in which he sees "the method in which knowledge is
transmitted from generation to generation" (qtd. in Singer,
128). (Blake's "unnamed forms" in the fifth chamber of the
Memorable Fancy correlate with Yeats's antinomies and Jung's
archetypes.)
8. In Weil's study of Balzac's androgyne she finds similar
imagery and concludes: "As the figure projects an ideal of
unity and wholeness, its narrative representation inevitably
undermines the arrival at that ideal and remains fragmented
and incomplete. We might venture to say that the androgyne
performs a continuing act of deconstruction on the text
itself, destabilizing at all levels the center and
boundaries of identity and presence. Like the symbol of
Ouraboros, the circular serpent eating its tail that in
hermetic philosophy symbolized a cosmic process of
androgynation, we see that beneath the appearance of an
'independent, absolute and self-sufficient organism,' the
androgyne reveals itself and its text to be a creature of
unrest and of necessary incompletion" (75). Weil finds this
element of androgyny unsatisfactory; I, on the other hand,
find it to be exactly the kind of androgyny we should be
willing to accept.
9. As Bullock-Kimball points out about Rilke's rose, the
nothing "is not a negation . . . but a nothing as an active,
creative force" (114).
10. In Taoist ideology the son is the yin aspect of the
father/son dichotomy; therefore, it an element of the
feminine principle.
11. Marian Pauson describes a similar Jungian psychic
healing:
[T]he hermaphrodite is symbolic of the
original sygyzy of the deeper self found in
all ancient cultures. This symbol of psychic
unity emerges from the collective unconscious in
times of distress as the great healer, as the
unifying principle. (103)
(Pauson here confuses the hermaphrodite, a physical anomaly,
with an androgyne, a metaphysical state of being, but the
principle of the psychic healing is the pertinent aspect of
her suggestion.)
12. Weil shows how incestuous imagery is not about
difference and division, but sameness and connectedness.
103
Works Cited
Baker, David. Rev. of The City in Which I Love 
You, by
Young Lee. Poetry 158 (1991): 164-67.
Bartlett, Lee. "God's Crooked Lines: William Everson 
and
C.G. Jung." The Centennial Review 27 (1983): 288-30
3.
Bly, Robert. American Poetry: Wildness and Domestic
ity.
New York: Harper, 1990.
 . Iron John: A Book About Men. New York: Random,
1990.
Bullock-Kimball, Beatrice Susanne. The European Heritage
 of
Rose Symbolism and Rose Metaphors in View of Rilke's 
Epitaph Rose. New York: Peter Lang, 1987.
Cederstrom, Lorelei. "The Principal Archetypal Elements 
of
The Golden Notebook." Approaches to Teaching Lessing'
s 
The Golden Notebook. Ed. Carey Kaplan and Ellen Cro
nan
Rose. New York: MLA, 1989. 50-57.
Cixous, Helene. "The Laugh of the Medusa." Modern
Feminisms: Political Literary, Cultural. Ed. and
Intro. Maggie Humm. New York: Columbia, 1992. 196-202
.
"Sorties." New French Feminisms. Eds. and Intros.
Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtviron. New York:
Schocken, 1980. 90-98.
Eagleton, Mary. Introduction. Feminist Literary Crit
icism.
Ed. Mary Eagleton. New York: Longman, 1991. 1-21.




Greenbaum, Jessica. Rev. of Rose and The
 City in Which I 
Love You, by Li-Young Lee. The Nation 253
 (1991):
416-18.
Heilbrun, Carolyn G. Toward a Recognitio
n of AndrogYnv.
New York: Norton, 1964.
 . Writing a Woman's Life. New York: 
Ballantine, 1988.
Irigaray, Luce. "This sex which is not o
ne." New French 
Feminisms. Eds. and Intros. Elaine Marks 
and Isabelle
de Courtivron. New York: Schocken, 1980. 
99-106.
Jung, Carl Gustay. The Archetypes of the 
Collective 
Unconscious. Trans. R.F.C. Hull. Vol. 9i 
of The
Collected  Works of C.G. Jung. 18 Vols. 
New York:
Bollingen, 1959.
Kamuf, Peggy. "Replacing Feminist Critic
ism." Feminist 
Literary Criticism. Ed. Mary Eagleton. 
New York:
Longman, 1991. 53-60.
Kitchen, Judith. Rev. of The City in Whi
ch I Love You, by
Li-Young Lee. The Georgia Review 45 (1
991): 160-63
 . Rev. of Rose, by Li-Young Lee. Th
e Georgia Review
42 (1988): 420-22.
Knowlton, Edgar C. Jr. Rev. of The City in 
Which I Love 
You, by Li-Young Lee. World Literature Toda
y 65
(1991): 771-2.
Landy, Francis. "The Song of Songs." The L
iterary Guide to
the Bible. Ed. Robert Alter and Fran
k Kermode.
Cambridge: Belknap P, 1987. 305-19.
105
Lee, Li-Young. The City in Which I Love 
You. Brockport,
BOA, 1990.
Interview. "Musings on the Poet's Plight." 
By
Karen Brailsford. Elle November 1991: 16
2.
 . Letter to the author. 14 March 1993.
 . Rose. Intro. Gerald Stern. Brockpor
t: BOA, 1986.
Marcus, Morton. "Poet's Gift." Santa Clara Va
lley's Weekly
Newspaper 3-9 Dec 1992: 39-40.
McGavran, James Holt Jr. "Coleridge, the W
ordsworths, and
Androgyny: A Reading of 'The Nightingale'." 
South
Atlantic Review 52.4 (1988): 57-75.
"Xanadu, Somersetshire, and the Banks of th
e Wye: A
Study of Romantic Androgyny." PLL 26 (1990):
 334-45.
McGovern, Martin. Rev. of Rose, by Li-Young 
Lee. The
Kenyon Review 9 (1987): 134-37.
Mitchell, Roger. Rev. of Rose, by Li-Young L
ee. The
erairie Schooner 63 (1989): 135-37.
Moder, Donna. "Aspects of Androgyny, Oedip
al Struggle, and
Religious Defence in the Poetry of Gerard M
anley
Hopkins." Literature and Psychology 32 (1986)
: 2-18.
Moi, Toni. Sexual/Textual Politics. New 
York: Routledge,
1985.
Mood, John J.L. Rilke on  Love and Other Diff
iculties: 
Translations  and Considerations of Rainer 
Maria Rilke.
New York: Norton, 1975.
Muske, Carol. Rev. of The City in Which I 
Love You, by Li-
106
Young Lee. NYTBR 96 (1991): 34-5.
Pauson, Marian L. Jung the Philosopher: Essays 
 in Jungian 
Thought. New York: Peter Lang, 1988.
Rector, Liam. Rev. of Rose, by Li-Young Lee. The 
Hudson 
Review 41 (1988): 399-401.
Selden, Raman. A Reader's Guide to Contemporary 
Literary
Theory. Lexington: U P of Kentucky, 1989.
Seward, Barbara. The Symbolic Rose. New York: Col
umbia UP,
1960.
Showalter, Elaine. "A Literature of One's Own." 
Feminist 
Literary. Criticism. Ed. Mary Eagleton. New Yor
k:
Longman, 1991. 24-36.
Singer, June K. The Unholy Bible: A Psychological
Interpretation of William Blake. New York: Harper,
1970.
Smith, Huston. The World's Religions: A Completely 
Revised
& Updated Edition of The Religions of Man. New Yor
k:
Harper, 1991.
Stolt,nberg, John. Refusing to be a Man: Essays on
 Sex and
Justice. Portland: Meridian, 1990.
Veeder, William. Mary Shelley & Frankenstein: The 
Fate of
Androgyny. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1986.
Walker, Barbara G. The Woran's Encyclopedia of Myths  an
d 
ecret_q. San Francisco: Harper, 1983.
Waniek, Marilyn Nelso. Rev. of The City in whjch I 
I2P.la, by Li-Young Lee. ing____Kkjaygn_Es_v_igy 13 (1991):
107
223-26.
Weigle, Marta. Spiders & Spinsters: Women  and Myt
hology.
Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 1982.
Weil, Kari. Androgyny and the Denial of Differenc
e.
Charlottesville: U P of Virginia, 1992.
Yeats, William Butler. Essays and Introductions. N
ew York:
MacMillan, 1961.
